

Editorial



In this issue we look at the precarious conditions of home-based care workers, migrancy and mining in the North West province, youth unemployment and vocational training, among other topics.

Home-based workers who look after those living with HIV and AIDS are precarious workers who often do not have wages and are paid stipends. Their services can be terminated at any time as there are no contracts. Itumeleng Moabi argues that although this is the case the workers provide a critical service which unfortunately is not given due recognition by the Department of Health.

Migrancy and mining in the North West province has been an issue of national importance since the Marikana massacre of August 2012 in which 34 miners were shot dead by the police. However, the issue of migrancy in the province is complex and characterised by the failure of unions and the collective bargaining system to transform the characteristics of the apartheid workplace. Furthermore, for workers on the platinum belt poor and filthy living conditions and the absence of essential services like running water and schools are a source of stress, write Neva Makgetla and Saul Levin.

The living wage of R12,500, which was a core demand by the workers at Marikana, came out of discussions from mineworkers from

the National Union of Mineworkers and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union writes Luke Sinwell in a recently published book *The Spirit of Marikana: The rise of insurgent unionism in South Africa*.

The debate on vocational education needs disambiguation. Unless this is done the arguments are murky, writes Lesley Powell. For example, there are not many jobs available for young workers and unemployment is caused by slow economic growth and low demand. There is also no evidence to suggest that unemployment is being caused by lack of education and skills.

The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, which is now organising across value chains, explains why this is important under globalising industries where some manufacturing components are being outsourced to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) where decent working conditions are diminishing. A value chain approach therefore covers all workers including those working for OEMs.

In Freedom Park Johannesburg women facilitators under the Community Literacy and Numeracy Group programme are making an important contribution to the lives of learners in primary school as well as adults, writes Thamsanqa Hamilton Hukwe. Among other things, the facilitators help manage

children's stress and also keep them off the streets and from drugs such as nyaope.

Workers' and student alliances need to embrace an anarchist approach, writes Leroy Maisiri. This approach focuses on building people's power and worker control.

Infrastructural programmes should not ride roughshod on poor communities. In Lesotho blasting related to the construction of the Metolong Dam has led to community houses collapsing or cracking and Sinohydro, the multinational company responsible, is playing hide and seek when it comes to compensating the communities of Ha Seeiso, Ha Makhale and Ha Makotoko, writes Hlalele Hlalele.

The rise of the informal economy in Zimbabwe is the result of deindustrialisation, the economic structural adjustment programme (Esap), and the fast track land reform programme. In a study focusing on three cities, Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare, Crispen Chinguno, Taurai Mereki and Nunurayi Mutyanda define the informal sector to include all economic activities characterised by precariousness, unfavourable working conditions, lack of or ignorance about social security and health care and the absence or a weak collective voice. ^{LB}

Elijah Chiwota
Editor

The South African Labour

Bulletin's mission is to:

- provide information and stimulate critical analysis and debate on issues and challenges that confront workers, their organisations and their communities; and
- communicate this in an accessible and engaging manner.

In so doing the SALB hopes to advance progressive politics, promote social justice and the interests of the working class.

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Inherited capitalist media haunts SA workers

Capitalist media is very quiet on working-class issues including pension funds and workers' rights to employment and I know why? In South Africa apartheid is still alive, well-oiled and maintained by a strong leadership that still believes in it. The current representatives, and benefactors of the monstrous system are still alive and will forever be with us. The likes of Koos Bekker (retired chief executive officer and chairperson of Naspers) will remain one of the strongest defenders of imperialist ideas while the poor suffer the most with the Consumer Price Index hitting double digits in weeks to come! Bosses must relax on gossip and retrenchments.

The working class goes an extra mile to sell their labour power, while some of their peers continue to inherit from apartheid legacies. Bekker inherited a media company which was funded by James Barry Munnik Hertzog. Hertzog, a Boer general during the second Anglo Boer War, became prime minister of the Union of South Africa from 1924 to 1939.

Throughout his life he encouraged the development of the Afrikaner, and under his command the Department of Labour was established. While the Wages Act (1925) laid down minimum wages for unskilled workers, it

excluded farm labourers, domestic servants, and public servants because they were predominantly black and African. The Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924 created job reservations for whites while excluding blacks from membership of registered trade unions and prohibited the registration of black trade unions.

Nasionale Pers (National Press) now Naspers was founded by Hertzog and Professor JI Marais, who funded Jan Smuts when he was at the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom, and also a funder of the National Party.

Bekker is enjoying inherited capital from apartheid empires which still haunt South Africans dating back to 1914. Former directors and editors of Naspers were prominent apartheid politicians - the likes of DF Malan, Hendrick Verwoerd and PW Botha. So why should we believe that the South African media will take a country led by black people seriously. So Bekker's daily job is to unleash the paparazzi to gush and rubbish the movement and government of the people under the leadership of the African Nation Congress.

Please report on issues which affect the working class and the poor and not only the stock market, Brent crude oil, gold and how the market fluctuates. Why not report

genuine issues shackling our people caused by financial sector oligopolies, and the evictions of poor people from their homes.

For Bekker's reference, elections are contested through the ballot and managed by the Independent Electoral Commission and not through the media. So please take our people seriously. The anti-majoritarian offensive which is perpetuated by the South African media in particular Naspers is tantamount to the media positioning itself as another arm of the state. Stop these smash and grab tactics to our democratic rights camouflaged as freedom of speech.

Loud hailing about government or regime change of a special type ranting government as not delivering through your daily newspapers and the modes of communications you own, is just a tactical lobbying strategy for regime change in our country which won't see the light of day in our life time as workers of this country. We are not surprised, of course that the likes of Bekker must continue to nourish the apartheid legacy as direct benefactors. **LB**

Mothusi Tsitsing is the Young Communist League of South Africa District Secretary for Dr Yusuf Dadoo in the West Rand in Johannesburg.

Outsourcing and burden of care

Home-based care workers demand better conditions

Community home-based care of those living with HIV and AIDS is often a neglected form of work. This explains why the workers are given stipends and not wages for work that is critical to their patients and communities. Therefore, it makes sense for their work to be insourced and not casualised, writes **Itumeleng Moabi**.

The struggle against outsourcing has been making headlines since 2015 when cleaners from all South African universities joined forces with students in a fight to end the outsourcing of essential services (cleaning, gardening and security) in their respective universities. Their partnership evolved well into the 'Fees Must Fall' Campaign, which ultimately forced universities to agree to initiate insourcing processes within agreed timelines.

Although it appears that the battle against outsourcing has been won, it seems that the war is just beginning. Whilst there has been much coverage of the end outsourcing campaign at universities, the same cannot be said of the outsourcing struggle in the health sector by Community Home-Based Care (CHBC) workers. CHBC workers are community-based volunteers within the Department of Health (DoH) whose purpose is to deliver medical support through monitoring of out-patients who are unable to visit the clinic. These volunteers have been in a battle to be insourced into the DoH since the end of 2015.

Recently, CHBC workers won a court case whose verdict

demanding they be assigned permanent status within the DoH. Since this verdict, workers have been introduced to a company called Smart Purse to initiate a process to permanently outsource them from the DoH instead of insourcing them. CHBC workers attending the 18th Khanya College Winter School recently held in Johannesburg revealed that, like university workers, they are forced to sign contracts with Smart Purse, even outside office hours. The DoH has also gone to the extent of not paying the workers their monthly stipends for three months.

The ramifications of this exclusion cuts deep for the workers who tearfully expressed concern for their patients. One of the workers attributed the attachment that patients had towards their respective care-givers to the sensitivity of disclosing one's status to everyone. She explained that she primarily works with elderly patients who were unwilling to establish trust with a new CHBC worker because of possible judgments about their status juxtaposed to their age. She was also worried about who will continue her work should something happen to her as she is elderly.

The reality is that CHBC workers cannot really decide not to go to work simply because they have not been paid, something many of us can do. The lives of their patients depend on them to an extent that another one of the CHBC workers has to phone one of her patients throughout the day to check on her and counsel her through tough days at home and at work. The stress of living with HIV and AIDS is overwhelming for most patients.

It is alarming that the testing services currently available in township and rural clinics are rather brash. One of the CHBC workers, also living with HIV, reports that they often had to counsel patients who tested HIV positive. This was the case because the patients were simply told they were dying of AIDS. In other words, when CHBC workers receive patients, they guide them through what it means to be HIV positive, how to tell their loved ones and partners about their status, treatment, diet and check-up appointments.

The first challenge that CHBC workers help patients with is how to disclose their status to partners and loved ones. For women, this is most challenging because of fears of 'divorce' and destitution without a man to support the household.



Shuffling through records: Jane Miya, home-based care worker, Alexandra, Johannesburg. Credit: William Matlala.

As a result, one CHBC worker said women opt for non-disclosure of their status, making it difficult to adhere to their treatment. For this reason, the rate of mother-to-child transmission through breastfeeding increases and most of the children test positive to HIV when they are between the ages of three and five years. For these children, the mothers will administer the treatment by lying to them that its flu medication until the child reaches a certain age when the questioning about the medication starts: Why am I getting flu medication without having flu or flu symptoms?

Through caring for infected children, these CHBC workers sometimes discover that in fact the whole family has been secretly living with HIV and not on treatment because of trying to maintain the 'family secret'. Sadly, HIV and AIDS is something that is not spoken about in most households because stigma is still rampant in township and rural communities. As such, trust is a valuable quality to have as a CHBC, making it difficult to desert patients because of non-payment of

stipends. Why then is it so easy for the department to discard CHBC workers when their patients are so dependent on their service?

Another challenge with caring for HIV and AIDS patients is household poverty. Many of the patients seen by these workers struggle to get food, let alone a balanced diet. It is difficult to discuss the dietary requirement part of the treatment when patients inform you that they use sleep as a way of avoiding hunger pains.

The daily realities of CHBC workers in the field is traumatic to say the least. However, they do not receive therapy for the traumas they face daily - violence, risk of infections and even death. For these workers, outsourcing is not only about monetary benefits, it is also about life and death for them as well as for their patients. No stipend for three months means they struggle to feed themselves and their families while also risking their own health daily. It also means that HIV and AIDS patients will be further neglected and ostracised by the system to a die alone.

At the end of this tearful discussion, it was increasingly

clear that in the interim whilst the CHBC workers campaign against outsourcing, independent resource centres are needed within communities to enable the workers to continue saving lives. The nature of these resource centres should encompass food gardens and grocery bins from which CHBC workers can secure food for their patients and their households as well as for their own families. They should also include counselling services and training for the workers to strengthen them emotionally as well as equip them when they are in the field.

Ultimately, the point that strongly came across from the CHBC workers was the need for communities to come together to support each other's struggles since they are all challenging the state through the various departments and portfolios. CHBC workers call for solidarity across all sectors against the contradictions within our society. ¹⁸

Itumeleng Moabi is a researcher with the Centre for Education Rights and Transformation at the University of Johannesburg.

A perfect storm

Migrancy and mining in the North West province

Industrial conflict on the platinum belt was caused, among other factors, by the over settlement in labour sending areas and the failure post-1994 to plan for settlements that catered for new migrants. Additionally strong unions and the collective bargaining system did not transform key characteristics of the apartheid workplace, write **Neva Makgetla** and **Saul Levin**.


BACKGROUND

The platinum industry was severely affected by prolonged strikes in 2012 and 2014, which lasted for months. Near Marikana in the North West province on 16 August 2015, police fired on strikers, killing 34 miners in the worst massacre since the transition to democracy in 1994. In both strikes, the miners and their families endured real hardship as they went months without pay.

The strikes could not be attributed simply to unusually low wages by national standards, although South African miners earned far less than their equals in Australia, the US and other industrialised economies. As Graph 1 shows, in 2014 the median wage for miners was around twice as high as in other sectors. Yet virtually no other industry saw workplace conflict of the bitterness experienced on the platinum mines. Moreover, the other major employers within mining, mostly in gold and coal, also did not experience similarly prolonged and rancorous strikes.

It follows that stresses other than pay alone must be explored to explain the intensity of workplace conflict on the platinum mines.

Graph 1: Median and average wage by sector, 2014 (a)



Source: *Labour Market Dynamics 2014*. Electronic database downloaded from www.statssa.gov.za in September 2015.

In engagements led by the presidency in 2012 and 2014, both employer and union representatives used the concept of migrant labour to capture the interaction between living and working conditions that caused unusual stress for miners in South Africa. They argued that circular migrant labour to the mines meant:

- The miners suffered from stressful living and community conditions.
- Miners faced higher financial

burdens because they provided for their families in labour-sending areas through remittances.

- Migrant labour was associated with a tradition of oppressive workplace relations and profound inequalities in returns from the mines, with an unusually large social and pay gap between workers and supervisors as well as a relatively low share of total value added going to labour.

The miners' migration to the North West platinum mines in the past decade was, however, very different from the historic oscillating migrancy enforced by apartheid legislation before 1994. Above all, migrancy in the North West was shaped, not by discriminatory laws, but by rapid growth in employment opportunities in the platinum belt in the context of the spatial inequalities entrenched under apartheid.

According to the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) from 2001 to 2012, employment in platinum climbed from 100,000 to 200,000, before dropping to 190,000 in 2014. Total mining employment in the North West, concentrated around Rustenburg and Brits (an hour or so west of Tshwane), rose from 125,000 in 2001 to a peak of 179,000 in 2011. The simultaneous decline in gold production and employment in other regions mean that these figures understate growth on the platinum mines. The iron ore mines in South Africa grew even faster than platinum in terms of output, but they only employed around 20,000 people.

The majority of platinum miners did not come from the traditional labour-sending areas in the Eastern Cape, Lesotho and Mozambique, but from other parts of the North West and Gauteng. Still, workers from the Eastern Cape were disproportionately represented among rock-drillers, who formed a relatively skilled, experienced and cohesive group of workers with a critical role in the production process. Rock drillers constitute around 15% of platinum miners.

The North West experience was by no means unique. Worldwide, the surge in metals prices that lasted from the early 2000s through 2011 led to rapid growth in many mines in relatively remote rural areas. If they were major employers, these projects faced a triple challenge. They had to:

- establish adequate infrastructure, including housing and social amenities for workers, which often entailed contestation around who should build and who should pay
- develop sound labour relations, management practices and competencies even as they rapidly expanded production
- manage working time and transport costs to enable miners to spend quality time with their families, who often remained in other regions while the development of human settlements lagged the growth of the mines themselves.

In the platinum belt, responses to these challenges by employers, workers, communities and the state built on practices and perceptions developed as part of the colonial and apartheid migrant labour system that historically centred largely on mining. On the whole, these responses failed to create living and working environments able to support either sustainable growth in platinum mining or secure, decent work and vibrant communities.

This article explores responses to current economic challenges in the platinum belt by both workers and employers, which were influenced but not determined by older forms of migrant labour. Its findings derive from analysis of earlier studies, statistics, company and regulatory reports and from group interviews conducted by Khulumani – an organisation established to give voice to victims of apartheid, initially as part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process and which also worked with the widows of the Marikana massacre – in the platinum belt and labour-sending areas. Seven group interviews were conducted with miners as well as family and community members in the North West and Eastern Cape provinces. They provided more detail and explored the perspectives of participants to complement the data analysis. In addition, human-resource

managers from the leading platinum companies were interviewed, and drafts of the research were workshopped with representatives of employers, unions and government departments.

The findings suggest the following:

1. The persistence of oscillating migrant labour in platinum, despite the elimination of residential laws, reflected:

- the persistence of over-settlement in labour-sending areas as a consequence of apartheid residential laws, and
- the failure from 1994 to acknowledge, monitor and plan adequately for the resulting migration to both existing and new economic centres, including the platinum belt.

Two decades after the end of apartheid, the former so-called 'homelands' still held almost a third of the population. The share had fallen substantially since 1994, but was still far more than could make a living there. A continual outflow of working-age adults resulted. Meanwhile, the mines of the platinum belt offered comparatively well-paid jobs for tens of thousands who did not have matric. However, human settlements around the platinum belt did not develop in step with the mines, and many miners argued that they could not subject their families to their poor living conditions.

2. Despite the establishment of strong unions and collective bargaining, neither employers nor workers managed to clearly identify and transform key characteristics of the apartheid workplace. From 1994, new labour laws ended arbitrary dismissals and overt discrimination, promoted organisational rights and improved safety and health care. By 2015, around two thirds of supervisors in the mines were African. But most workers still saw no chance of promotions or seniority increments, and experienced employer decisions as arbitrary and discriminatory. Moreover, managers and supervisors,



Many miners feel they cannot subject their families to their poor living conditions.

especially if white, had far better housing and work facilities than other workers. These conditions led to continual workplace conflict, with workers generally demanding higher pay rather than systemic changes.

During the commodity boom, the system worked despite these problems because profits were high and pay for miners increased rapidly in real terms. With the end of the boom, however, pay levelled out, often without much explanation to workers, who resisted through strikes. In response, the international mining companies began to divest and both employers and the state started to explore underground mechanisation, which could ultimately replace a significant number of miners.

A less costly strategy in economic and social terms would be to transform the apartheid workplace and pay scales as well as to improve human settlements – in the sense of community agency as well as housing and social services – for miners. But neither was easy. Upgrading the mines as workplaces would require a shift from systems of work organisation and supervision that were familiar to both managers and

miners, and reinforced by myriad long-established practices and investments in facilities and training. Improving human settlements around the mines proved expensive and hard to deliver. Moreover, the municipalities of the platinum belt were poorly capacitated and hemmed in by ‘traditional’ authorities. These challenges were aggravated by the widely held view that the miners were somehow still ‘migrants’ even though, in line with the democratic dispensation, the vast majority were South African citizens.

CONTEXT OF MINING BOOM

The years from 2000 saw a fundamental shift in South African mining, with a boom in platinum contributing to diversification away from gold – and with it, a relocation of the centre of mining from Gauteng and the Free State to the North West and Limpopo. As a result, the relatively small towns of the platinum belt saw an extraordinary influx of miners and others seeking opportunities in their newly booming economies.

Platinum mining was driven by three trends over the past 15 years, which are mining investments,

platinum demand and metal prices.

Mining investment in South Africa diversified as the gold mines matured, with a rapid shift in the structure of production away from gold and towards platinum and iron ore. Iron ore employed only a fraction of the number in platinum, even though it was one of South Africa’s two largest exports in 2014.

Platinum demand increased globally as the US and some other industrialised countries mandated catalytic converters in cars, starting in the 1970s. In effect, this trend changed platinum from a luxury metal used largely in jewelry to an industrial input, with generally more robust sales. Demand levelled out from around 2008, however, as the global financial crisis cut into car sales while technological shifts reduced the amount of platinum required for catalytic converters and promoted recycling.

Finally, metals prices generally surged from the early 2000s through 2011, but then declined sharply and seemed unlikely to improve at least through 2020. Prices in 2011, in constant dollars, were higher than at any point since 1980, but have since fallen sharply.


These trends meant that investment, production and employment in platinum climbed rapidly from 1999 through 2008, as Graph 2 shows. They then levelled out and, from around 2011, declined. Employment almost doubled while production rose by around a third from 2000 to 2011. The 2008/9 global financial crisis initiated a phase of fluctuations and slower growth, which turned to a decline from 2011. In this context, the strikes in 2012 and 2014 saw months of low production, during which the companies sold off reserves that had built up over the previous few years of stagnant demand. More recent data were not available, but the continued sharp fall in prices in 2015 saw further shrinkage in both output and employment.

Through 2014, three companies – Anglo Platinum, Impala Platinum and Lonmin – accounted for around 80% of South Africa’s platinum production and 70% of platinum employment. The decline in platinum demand and prices meant that their return on capital (that is, after-tax profits compared to asset value) fell sharply. It averaged 20% before the global financial crisis, dropped to 8% in 2009/10, and fell to near or below zero in 2013 and 2014 (Graph 3). The share prices for the three companies dropped between 60% and 98% from 2011 through late 2015. By then, Lonmin was teetering on the brink of bankruptcy.

In November 2015, Anglo Platinum sold three of its mines to Sibanye Gold for R4,5-billion, saying the sale was motivated by labour conflict and low prices.


Mining employment in the North West mirrored the global trends that first fostered and then battered platinum from the turn of the century. From 2000 to 2008, mining production in the province expanded by almost 50%. Mining employment rose almost as fast, from 132,000 to a peak of 186,000.

Graph 2: Indices of the platinum price (a), production and employment, 1994 to 2014 (1994=100)



Note: (a) Average annual price. Sources: Calculated from: for prices, average annual price downloaded from historical data at www.kitco.com in November 2015; for employment, data provided by the DMR in October 2015; for production, data on platinum supply by country downloaded from www.platinum.matthey.com in October 2015.

Graph 3: Return on assets (a) by company and weighted average for all three, 2007 to 2014



Note: (a) Estimated as after-tax profits as percentage of total assets. Source: Calculated from company annual reports for relevant years.


The global financial crisis brought a fall in production and employment, and the recovery from the crisis was reversed with the sharp fall in prices from 2011. Overall, the North West's mining production dropped by over a quarter, and employment by almost a tenth, from 2008 to 2013 (Graph 4).

In 2013, in current rand, the North West's mining output came to R74-billion, equal to 31% of total value added in the province. That was up from just over 20% through the 1990s. In Bojanala, which housed most of the platinum mines, the contribution of mining to the regional product exceeded 40%. Rustenburg accounted for three fifths of the district's mining output and Madibeng for a fifth.

The share of miners in the North West's employment also rose, from 15% in 2002 to around 23% in 2013. In other words, by 2013 around one employed person in four in the North West was a miner, up from about one in seven a decade earlier. In this context, the overall increase in the number of miners masked a shift from gold and coal to platinum, and with it a relocation of mining from other areas of the North West to the platinum belt. According to the Rustenburg local municipality around half of all employees were in mining in 2010.


Comprehensive data on the origins of the miners in the platinum belt were not available, but company reports provided some insights. Lonmin and Implats reported on the origins of their workers. As Graph 5 shows, the share of migrants from the traditional labour-sending areas of the Eastern Cape and outside South Africa varied substantially, from half in the case of Lonmin to under a third for Implats Rustenburg operations. The bulk of the remaining workers came from the North West, but many moved from outside the platinum belt, including from downsized gold mines in Gauteng and the Free State.

Graph 4: Value of mining production in 2013 rand (a) and mining employment in North West, 2001 to 2013



Note: (a) Current value of mining production deflated using Consumer Price Index (CPI) reweighted to 2013. Figures for the volume of production are not used because they do not adequately indicate the effects of the substantial international price increases of the 2000s on the structure of production and revenues. Source: Calculated from DMR provincial mineral production and mining employment. Downloaded from www.quantec.co.za in November 2015.

Graph 5: Origins of miners at Lonmin in 2014 and Implats Rustenburg operations in 2009




Source: Lonmin, Sustainability Report 2013, p 40; Implats, Sustainable Development Report 2009, p 65.

The mining boom brought relatively rapid growth to the North West from 2001 to 2011, with faster growth across the productive sectors than in the rest of the country. Graph 6 shows growth in the total provincial product and by sector, with mining deflated by the CPI rather than using constant prices in order to capture the impact of the commodity boom. By these data, the North West economy grew almost 5% a year from 2001 to 2011, while the rest of the economy expanded just over 4% a year. The pattern reversed from 2011, however, with a fall in mining output in constant rand pulling down overall provincial production outside of private services, trade and government to below the rest of the country. For these two years, the latest for which provincial data are available, the North West economy expanded only 0.5% a year while the rest of the economy grew 2% annually.

In short, the global commodity boom of the 2000s brought a rapid expansion in mining in the platinum belt of the North West province. That in turn led to an influx of miners into the relatively small

Graph 6: Average annual percentage growth in value added in mining deflated by CPI (a) and in other industries in volume terms in the North West and the rest of the country from 2001 to 2011 and 2011 to 2013



Notes: Excel spreadsheets on GDP and Producer Price Index (PPI) downloaded from www.statssa.gov.za in December 2014.

towns of the platinum belt. From 2011, however, stagnant demand and falling prices began to slow and even reverse this trend.¹⁸

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and industrial policy, inequality and economic inclusion, and sustainable growth. This article is taken from a working paper titled: 'A perfect storm: Migrancy and mining in the North West province'.

A more detailed version of this article is available as a Trade and Industry Policy Strategies (TIPS) working paper at www.tips.org.za.



Remembering Marikana Massacre: Workers gather around Wonderkop to remember the slain workers.

Human settlements, migrancy and stress

Filthy living conditions

Housing for many workers consists of shacks with no running water or flush toilets in an area where rubbish is not collected and schools non-existent. This stresses a lot of workers, write **Neva Makgetla** and **Saul Levin**.

In group interviews, conducted by Nomarussia Bonase and Judy Seidman of Khulumani Support Group in 2014 and 2015 miners unanimously complained about substandard human settlements and government services in the platinum belt. Workers argued that their poor housing in itself proved they should be paid more. As one group interview participant puts it:

‘Our government is saying we are earning a lot of money. How come it claims that we are earning a lot, being as we are living in these conditions? Who likes to live in these filthy, bad conditions? There is no electricity and no water. Who would like to stay in these conditions?’

The failure to develop adequate human settlements in the platinum belt resulted from:

- The weaknesses of the housing market in the region combined with backlogs in infrastructure left by apartheid in the former ‘homeland’ spaces.
- Weak resourcing of the municipalities and provincial agencies.
- The reluctance of ethnic ‘traditional’ authorities in the former so-called ‘homeland’ regions of the platinum belt to provide land for formal housing to workers from other parts of South Africa.

Meanwhile, although the democratic era brought an end to residential restrictions, the former ‘homeland’ areas across the country remained artificially over-crowded and impoverished regions with inadequate infrastructure and productive resources. They had far higher joblessness than the rest of the country as well as generally much lower incomes. In these circumstances, miners argued that they had no choice but to seek work in the platinum belt, but that they could not bring their families to stay. Instead, they continued to support and build houses for their children, parents and siblings in other, more hospitable although often poorer regions. Their decisions were clearly influenced by the history and traditions of circular migrant labour in their

families and communities. But they also demonstrated how the legacies of apartheid residential and citizenship laws and spending patterns continued to constrain life choices and opportunities for most South Africans.

In the group interviews, the Marikana widows who were given employment on the mines after their husbands were killed brought the dilemma facing migrant workers to the fore. They felt they could not bring their children to the platinum belt, where living conditions were unacceptable. As a result, said one, ‘my children are being orphaned twice – once when their father was killed, and now that I am not there to help them grow. But what choice do I have?’

THE STATE OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

A snapshot of Rustenburg and Madibeng from Census data for 2001 and 2011 (unless otherwise noted) indicates the scope of the social challenges associated with the rapid expansion in the platinum mines.

- The population of Rustenburg and Madibeng grew by almost 300,000 from 2001 to 2011, or 40%, to reach just over a million, with around half a million in each municipality. In contrast, the population of South Africa as a whole climbed only 16% from 2001 to 2011, and the rest of the North West by 10%. Only the metros in Gauteng grew as fast as the platinum belt. The share of people in Rustenburg and Madibeng who spoke Tswana as their first language fell from 58% in 2001 to 48% in 2011.
- Because most of the migrants into the two municipalities were working-age men, their share in the population climbed to 40% of the total, compared to a national average of 32%. Women made up 52% of the population nationally, but just 47% in Rustenburg and Madibeng.
- By 2011, 34% of the residents of Madibeng and Rustenburg lived in informal housing, compared to a national average of 14% and, in Gauteng, 19%. The number of informal residences in Rustenburg and Madibeng climbed from 80,000 in 2001 to 123,000 in 2011, even though the number of formal stand-alone houses rose even faster, from 110,000 to 200,000.
- Informal housing almost inevitably meant worse facilities. Only 45% of residents in Rustenburg and Madibeng had a flush toilet, compared to a national average of 60% and, in Johannesburg, almost 90%. The majority of platinum belt residents used unimproved pit toilets, which in crowded settlements were unhygienic and risked contaminating the ground water. According to the Bojanala Platinum District Municipality only a quarter of households in Bojanala as a whole had a sanitation system that discharged to a water treatment works. At the bulk level, demand in

Rustenburg for infrastructure outstripped supply by 2012 says the local municipality. In 2011, half the residents in Rustenburg and Madibeng said they had no refuse removal – about the same as for the rest of the North West but well above the national average of a third of households, and far worse than Gauteng at under one in ten. Municipal and private refuse sites often ended up dealing with hazardous and medical waste as well as dead animals, for which they were not equipped.

- In contrast, on paper Rustenburg and Madibeng residents fared the same as or better than the rest of the country when it came to electricity and water on site. Some 77% said they had piped water in their houses or plots, compared to 73% nationally, while 71% had electricity compared to 70% in the rest of the country. The quality of these services was, however, often worse than in more developed parts of the country, with frequent interruptions and poor-quality supply.

The lack of adequate roads was a further challenge.

‘In Nkaneng, there are no roads, and few cars struggle over the uneven muddy dirt roads that taxis refuse to drive on. Everyone must walk to the main road to get taxis. For many this is a very long distance, when it rains many cannot leave their homes ...’

‘The roads are the pivot of a whole range of activities that are denied to the community as a result. For example, not being able to buy large grocery items, or attend school or work when it rains heavily, which is extremely common in the summer. Most importantly, it is impossible for ambulances to reach sick or injured people inside Nkaneng because of the road, especially crucial during the strikes and the massacre,’ wrote C. Naicker.

MINERS' HOUSING

The in-migration of miners affected some communities far more than others. The established towns of Rustenburg, Hartbeespoort and Brits expanded by around 50%. Excluding these towns, ten communities in Rustenburg and Madibeng accounted for half of total population growth in the two municipalities. The average size of these ten smaller communities climbed from 18,000 residents in 2001 to 32,400 in 2011, or by 80%. As a result, where they made up a quarter of the population of Rustenburg and Madibeng in 2001, by 2011 they had reached a third.

In addition to these settlements, in-migration and informal housing expanded rapidly on commercial farmland in Madibeng. In contrast to settlements near the mines, it appears that most of these in-migrants were working on the farms. Overall population density in these areas remained very low, at seven households and 17 people per square kilometre. Of the 56,000 people in the areas that made up Madibeng Non-Urban in 2011, only 36% spoke Tswana or Tsonga, while 35% had migrated into the area after 2001. Two thirds were employed, but of the employed some 67% earned under R1,600 a month – far below miners' wages and much lower than the incomes found in more densely settled areas. A third lived in informal houses, half in formal stand-alone housing, and 3% in ‘traditional’ houses.

Three communities stood out as destinations for miners from outside the North West – Wonderkop in Madibeng and Freedom Park and Marikana in Rustenburg. Although not the largest or the fastest growing settlements, they were unusually dominated by working-age men living in informal housing, often in a single room with substandard services.

Each of these communities had around 20,000 residents in 2011. Wonderkop, which includes some

older hostels, had grown by 66% in the past ten years, or 8,700 people, while both Freedom Park and Marikana had tripled in size - that is, they had grown over 10% a year. Freedom Park expanded by 15,400 and Marikana by 13,200. In contrast, Bojanala as a whole grew at just under 2.5% a year. Even that rate, which is on a par with Gauteng, is extraordinarily high by global standards.

In 2011, over half the residents in Wonderkop, Freedom Park and Marikana were working-age men. That compares with a national average of 32%, and around 40% for Rustenburg and Madibeng as a whole. Working-age men accounted for around 60% of the population growth in Wonderkop and Marikana, and 52% of the growth in Freedom Park. In all three settlements, only around 35% of residents were women. Some 58% of residents said they lived alone, and 62% of residents had only one room.

In 2011, a third of the residents

of the three communities said they had migrated from outside the North West after 2001, with the Eastern Cape accounting for the lion's share of in-migrants. In Wonderkop, 17% of all residents said they had migrated from the Eastern Cape after 2001, compared to 12% in the other two settlements. The three settlements together accounted for almost two out of five immigrants from the Eastern Cape into the North West after 2001.

Residents in all three settlements reported relatively high levels of employment and incomes, which contrasted sharply with their impoverished living and social conditions.

In all three settlements, the share of working-age people with employment was over 50%. In Marikana, the figure was 59%. That compares to a national average of around 40%, and 25% in the former 'homeland' regions. Earned incomes were also relatively high. In 2011,

47% of employed people nationally earned over R3,200 a month. In Wonderkop, Marikana and Freedom Park, the figure was 62%.

Combined with relatively high employment levels, higher earned incomes meant households were relatively prosperous in cash terms. In South Africa as a whole, 44% of households had annual incomes of less than R19,200 a year in 2011. In the three settlements, the figure was only 28%.

Yet despite comparatively high household incomes, over half the residents of Wonderkop, Marikana and Freedom Park lived in informal housing, only around two thirds had electricity for lighting and piped water on site, and most had no rubbish removal. While there were differences between the communities, all had substandard services. As Table 1 shows, living conditions were significantly worse than in most other settlements in Rustenburg and Madibeng, and indeed nationally.



Table 1. Housing and services in Wonderkop, Marikana and Freedom Park compared to national average, 2011

Facilities	Wonderkop	Marikana	Freedom Park	National
Population	21,800	23,200	19,500	51,770,600
Number of households	11,100	11,700	13,400	14,450,200
Of which, percentage with:				
Formal standalone house	8%	41%	37%	65%
Informal backyard shack	13%	18%	32%	5%
Informal standalone house	63%	23%	21%	9%
Other (mostly multi-family buildings)	16%	18%	10%	21%
Electricity for lighting	83%	59%	49%	85%
Refuse removal	6%	38%	67%	65%
Flush toilet	9%	51%	67%	57%
Pit latrine without ventilation	71%	27%	24%	19%
Bucket or none	5%	5%	6%	7%
Other	15%	17%	4%	16%
Piped water in dwelling	14%	26%	31%	46%
Piped water in yard	68%	32%	35%	27%
Borehole	7%	5%	1%	6%
Unimproved or tanker	2%	9%	7%	11%
Water vendor	6%	3%	16%	1%
Other	3%	25%	10%	8%

Source: Calculated from relevant series in Statistics South Africa, Census 2011. Downloaded from www.quantec.co.za in November 2014.

If you lived in Wonderkop, Marikana or Freedom Park, you were:

- seven times more likely than other South Africans to have to buy water from a vendor
- four times more likely to live in an informal house or backyard shack
- twice as likely to have a pit latrine without ventilation and to have no municipal refuse removal
- half as likely to have a formal house with piped water inside.

These conditions proved particularly galling for many miners because they were employed in formal jobs and lived in urban settings. The population density in Freedom Park in 2011 was 3,660 per square metre; it was over 1,100 in Marikana and almost 400 in Wonderkop. For comparison, Johannesburg averaged 2,700 people per square metre. In addition, miners often felt they

ended up paying inflated sums for inadequate housing, water and other services.

Poor housing conditions went along with weak social services. According to Bojanala Integrated Development Plan, as a rule no educational facilities were provided in informal settlements because the education departments considered them to be temporary. This situations, the plan notes, had endured for over a decade, 'obviously making it very difficult for learners in informal settlements to have a basic education'. While most settlements had a health facility, Bojanala had just 31 police stations and magistrates offices to serve a million people.

Even where the facilities existed, they were often of poor quality. Over 200 schools and at least 17 clinics in Bojanala had only inadequate access to water services. In schools over-use of pit latrines caused a health risk.

The lack of municipal services combined with extensive mining to degrade the environment especially air and water. Water suffered from both run-off from the slime dams and from inadequate sewerage systems. The air was polluted by mining emissions and use of coal and wood for cooking in many households.

According to the survey by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) in 2012, of miners who belonged to a union, 20% in the North West said that poor housing was a major source of stress, compared to 3% in the rest of the country. ¹⁶

This article is taken from a Trade and Industry Policy Strategies (TIPS) working paper titled: 'A perfect storm: Migrancy and mining in the North West province', available at www.tips.org.za

Marikana

Architects of the R12,500

The now infamous living wage of R12,500, which workers were killed for on the mountain in Marikana, was not initially something which was demanded, nor was its creators uncompromising or violent, as has been suggested by the Marikana Commission of Inquiry. Rather, the idea of R12,500, in its first instance, was simply a memorandum of requests which was put forth by both the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Association of Mining and Construction Union (Amcu) members at Karee shaft in Lonmin for consideration by management. An excerpt below from **Luke Sinwell** and **Siphiwe Mbatha's** new book, *The Spirit of Marikana: The Rise of Insurgent Trade Unionism in South Africa* (Pluto Press and Wits University Press), offers a preview regarding how two rock drill operators (RDOs) met in the changing rooms at one mine and began a process that has gone down in history.

Alfonse Ramaola Mofokeng – perhaps the unacclaimed architect of the R12,500 demand at Lonmin – is a humble and articulate Sotho man, born on 9 December 1979 in Botshabelo, the third largest town in the Free State. He speaks slowly and precisely, highlighting to the listener the significance of each word, and repeats himself often for clarity. Possibly because of the harshness of conditions underground, he looks older than he actually is. Like many other black men who later came to work at the mines, he was unable to complete his matric because of financial and other difficulties.

He did not finish Standard 5, and went to work at a farm called Montic Dairy at the age of about 14. In 1999 he was contracted to work at Goedgevonden Colliery in Mpumalanga, and within five years he had become an RDO at Bleskop mine (Khuseleka 1).

Following the dismissals of May 2011 following an unprotected strike at Karee shaft, which led to the selective rehiring of workers, Lonmin representatives went in search of workers, especially RDOs, because the decision not to take back some perceived troublemakers had left gaps in their workforce. The positions were soon filled, and Mofokeng

was among those who took them. In mid-2011 he arrived at the Karee mine and joined the NUM, the dominant union at Lonmin:

‘When I arrived I was part of those people to try to build NUM in Karee in [the second half of] 2011. But in 2012, I saw that the NUM does not get the membership in Karee. It’s where I thought about this. I found that Amcu has got the majority in Karee and NUM does not have the majority but I was a member of it.’

Mofokeng had spent less than a year working at Lonmin before concluding that workers deserved more money for the tough work they were undertaking daily.

THE THE RISE OF
 SPIRIT INSURGENT
 OF TRADE
 UNIONISM IN
 SOUTH AFRICA
 MARIKANA
 LUKE SINWELL
 WITH SIPHIWE MBATHA

He had gained experience working in the three largest platinum mines in the world. His attitude was also shaped by his coming from Impala, where RDOs were then (in 2012) making more money than they did at Lonmin. At Karee the machinery they used was lighter and designed for single operators, but Mofokeng was nevertheless further disappointed that at Karee, unlike in the other shafts - Eastern and Western - RDOs had no assistants to carry the cumbersome machines:

'I found the money at Lonmin, it's small. As the money is so small, it was clear that Lonmin doesn't have the truth. It was apartheid. They don't treat people equally. And they are doing the same job. Those that they [management] liked, they gave them assistants. And there are those that they ... don't give assistants. That's the thing that hurt my heart the most, when I look at my salary. The money, it's small ... after deduction, it comes to R4,000, R3,900. That's the thing that triggers me. And then I end up calling the guys and say, "Hey ... let's approach the management about this money."

Mofokeng met a Xhosa man named Bulelani Magqabini in the changing rooms in late May 2012 after completing a tough day's work underground. They had both been working at Lonmin for less than a year, but that day they began a process of uniting workers - one that has gone down in history. Mofokeng recalls, 'I started to talk with other guys here about going to approach management because we work hard.' He told the workers, 'We don't have to meet these union guys because we will confuse ourselves. Because there are two [unions] we don't know which will agree and which will disagree. It's our right to approach management if things are not going well.'

At the outset they had no intention of striking. Their main concern was that management take note of the hard work that they were doing underground as RDOs with no assistants. They also discussed what basic salary would adequately compensate them for their work, and agreed on a figure of R12,500.

Magqabini did not have any notable previous experience as a leader of the miners. He was born on 24 August 1976 in the Eastern Cape in Dutywa, where he began his schooling. He then moved to Germiston and continued his education. In 1999 he took his matric, but failed. He attempted to join the South African National Defence Forces (SANDF) but without success, and in 2001 he began doing contract work at a gold mine in Klerksdorp where his aunt's husband was employed. Once Magqabini had gained enough experience he became a permanent employee at Klerksdorp between May 2004 and 2011. During that time, he was a member of the NUM.

Magqabini had also begun working at Karee in May/June 2012. He and Mofokeng chose to join different unions. Magqabini remembered that when he first arrived at Karee, he joined Amcu.

The NUM became increasingly unpopular at Karee, given that it did not support workers during an unprotected strike over one of the NUM leaders in 2011 and over time the Amcu developed a stronghold primarily because it had a strong new regional organiser in a man popularly known as Steve. Mofokeng, however, decided to join the NUM. He believed that as a new employee, he would find it beneficial to be part of the dominant union at Lonmin.

Mofokeng recalled that during a conversation he and Magqabini had in late May when the two RDOs had first met in the

changing rooms, 'we reached a point where we talked about combining workers'. The two men agreed that 'even if it can be like five RDOs, it will be fine. Five to ten people and discuss about this issue.' At the outset they had no intention of striking. Their main concern was that management take note of the hard work that they were doing underground as RDOs with no assistants. They also discussed what basic salary would adequately compensate them for their work, and agreed on a figure of R12,500. Mofokeng explained:

'We sat down, me and Magqabini, two of us. And then we said, because we see that we are earning 4,500, some 4,900, [we thought our salary should be] 5,000 plus [an additional] 5,000 ... We took the wages we are earning, we multiply it times two. And then we saw that if we can take the salary that we are getting and multiply it twice, that this will be an amount of money that can satisfy us ... according to the work we are doing ... That's why when I spoke to the workers I said, '12,500 is the money that can satisfy us.'

In fact R10,000 was approximately twice the then salary of an RDO, but the two men reckoned that it was worth asking for the additional R2,500 by calling on management's 'sympathy' for the workers: 'He can put some other cents that come from him [and] when it combines with this R10,000, it will be like R12,500.' ¹⁸

Luke Sinwell is a senior researcher with the South African Research Chair in Social Change. He is an ethnographer of contentious politics and the co-editor of 'Contesting Transformation: Popular Resistance in Twenty-First-Century South Africa' and a co-author of 'Marikana: A View from the Mountain and a Case to Answer'.

Siphiwe Mbatha is a coordinator of the Thembelible Crisis Committee and a part-time researcher at the University of Johannesburg.

Author's note: *I was given permission and strongly encouraged by those who we interviewed to apply the actual names of mineworkers to this story. The names of these people are indeed appropriate in order that we can begin to collectively remember that those who lived and died in Marikana were real people with concrete histories. The quotations applied in this excerpt are drawn from interviews conducted by Siphiwe Mbatha and Luke Sinwell between 2013 and 2014. Siphiwe and I triangulated the data with the findings of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry, with dozens of other workers (between 2012 and 2015), as well as the first minutes which were taken by the two workers discussed in this article when they first met with management at Karee mine (Mike da Costa) on 21 June 2012. This excerpt is merely one minor part of a much broader story that is explained in the book.*

Disposable generation

Role of vocational education in youth unemployment

High youth unemployment is caused mainly by slow economic growth and low demand and not because workers lack the right education and skills as the myth suggests. However, alternatives exist that see education as important to critical understanding, engagement and transformation, writes **Lesley Powell**.

In this article I attempt to get beyond the 'black box' of one of the crucial issues for Vocational Education (VE): the relationship between VE and work. The specific focus is on VE and unemployment. In its crudest presentation, the debate on the relationship between VE and the world of work has existed for much of the past half century on two polar ends. On the one end of the argument are sociological concerns about the role that VE has played in reproducing the working class and more recently, the role that it has played in producing a surplus labour force. On the other end are arguments related to the human resource needs of the labour market and the economy such as those presented by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the role that VE plays in providing such.

Floating across this debate are philosophical concerns about the relationship that VE has to the world of work and the implications that this has for what has been termed a 'vocational pedagogy'. Embedded in this is the tension that exists between different notions

of a vocational pedagogy which represents a tension between a liberal pedagogy and a critical pedagogy.

This article begins with an overview of the context in which we find ourselves. This is followed by a discussion on the role of VE as it is currently constructed. I then discuss the critique and concerns with the assumptions that underpin South African VE policy and thereafter I briefly highlight alternate theoretical frameworks that might be brought to the table in our 're-imagining of the purpose' of VE. I conclude by providing a brief overview of the work planned as part of the Research Chair of Youth Unemployment and Empowerment.

CONTEXT

The dramatic explosion of unemployment around the world has resulted in the creation of what Yates describes as the 'human-as-waste'. Drawing on Davis's notion of 'surplus humanity', she argues that the price of capitalist production in the neo-liberal age is the production of 'surplus humanity' who, for all

intents and purposes, are humans discarded as waste by capitalist production. Unlike the surplus labour of yesteryear, and in contradiction to Marx's belief that cycles of surplus labour would be reabsorbed during future phases of expansion, all evidence is that 'this is a mass of humanity structurally and biologically redundant to global accumulation,' as Davis puts it. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the 205-million unemployed in the world exist as 'permanent surplus labour'.

ILO warns that this perverse boom of unemployment is amplified in developing contexts and that women, young people and rural communities are disproportionately affected.

Solutions-for-youth-Employment estimate that a third of the world's youth (defined as 15 to 29 years old) are unemployed. Of great concern is that all indications are that these staggering totals are on the increase. The ILO estimates that by 2019 global unemployment will affect a shocking 212-million people and that youth unemployment will rise by at least 8%.



White Paper on Post School Education and Training says high quality technical and vocational education and training can end poverty. Credit: William Matlala.

South Africa, meanwhile, has reached its highest recorded levels of unemployment. According to StatsSA of the 36.1-million South Africans who are of working age, 5.4-million are unemployed and nearly 15-million are not economically active either because they are discouraged from finding jobs and/or because they are involved in caring roles in their family. Following the international trajectory, women, youth and people living in rural areas are the greatest affected. Of the 11.3-million young South Africans who are not involved in education and training, 3.6-million are unemployed and 9.8-million have given up on the prospect of employment and stopped seeking work.

Pali Lehohla describes the triple crisis of unemployment, inequality and poverty as a 'cocktail of disasters'. Faced with the crisis of more than half of South Africans living below the poverty line, almost half of South Africa's youth are unemployed and hardly likely to ever enter the labour market and a Gini coefficient that marks

the country as one of the most unequal in the world, education and training development has been brought to the forefront as a key strategy for addressing the 'triple crisis'.

In line with this, the White Paper on Post School Education and Training (PSET) identifies increased 'access to high quality post-school education as a major driver in fighting poverty, inequality and unemployment' in South Africa. To this end, the White Paper and the National Development Plan (NDP) have set ambitious targets for expanding PSET. Against a background of approximately 2.8-million young people (18 to 24 year olds) who are not in employment or in education and training (NEET), a central priority for policy is to address the need for high quality Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) which is accessible in all provinces and in all locales. In terms of this, the NDP recommends expanding participation in the colleges from the current 300,000 enrolments to over a million by 2030.

In addition, Community Education Training Centres (CETCs) are to be established that are to play a critical role in catering for adults and youth who did not complete their schooling or who did not attend school at all and therefore do not qualify to study at TVET colleges and universities. Underlying this commitment to increased participation is a deeper logic about how this contributes to reducing poverty and unemployment that is well presented by Anderson who argues that human capital theory is core to the policy and practice of vocational education. Building on Giddens concept of 'productivism', he argues that the underlying paradigm is built on two interrelated assumptions. The first is that 'training leads to productivity, [which] leads to economic growth (training for-growth)'. The assumption is that this will, in turn, increase government revenues through increased taxes and thereby increase public spending on social services; also, that this will result in an expansion in production which will lead to job creation.



Workers during training: Is there a connection between skills and economic growth? Credit: William Matlala.

The second is that 'skills lead to employability [which] leads to jobs (skills-for-work)' and which thereby reduced poverty and unemployment. As with other middle income countries, since post-apartheid the South African policy narrative for TVET colleges has been located within this 'productivist' logic in that the TVET colleges are expected to fuel economic development by providing the skills required to compete in challenging and changing global and national economic contexts.

Simultaneously, they are also to contribute to social justice by widening participation in programmes targeted at employability within communities most affected by unemployment.

Within the framework of the dominant orthodoxy, the mainstream debate – insofar as there is anything that can meaningfully be described as a debate – is of a 'disconnect and misalignment' between education and the economy. This position is succinctly put forward by the HSRC that expresses concern that South Africa's economy has dramatically improved during this period [2003-2008], with a growth rate approaching 5% in 2006. However,

these positive developments have not filtered down into the education and training (ET) sphere'.

This understanding of a dialectical connection between economic growth and education and training has translated into one central question for education policy: How can the gap between education and the world of work be narrowed? This faith in the connection between education and economic growth has translated in South Africa into the supposition that skills shortages hamper firm productivity which then restrains economic growth which, in turn, limits job creation. The argument is also presented in reverse, without skills development innovation is curbed, which limits job creation and this, in turn, restrains economic development. The assumption, as provided by Vally and Motala is that 'there is a readily available supply of jobs if the prerequisite skills are there – or that, conversely, once there are skills in the market the jobs will follow'.

Notwithstanding the emphasis on the education-economy nexus, very little empirical evidence of a connect between education and economic growth and even less

between vocational education and economic growth exists. Studies that have attempted such measures within developed contexts, even within a human capital approach, have found scant evidence of a relationship between education and economic growth. Wolf, for example, studied the relationship between education and economic growth in the United Kingdom. She argues that the 'belief in a simple, direct relationship between the amount of education in a society and its future growth rate, and that governments can fine-tune education expenditures to maximise that self-same rate of growth' is incorrect and unsubstantiated by any empirical data. Furthermore, that simple beliefs in a direct relationship between education and national economic growth have resulted in educational 'expansion as an end in itself' and nations adopting policy frameworks that fail to achieve the economic growth hoped for, that are ill conceived for helping the poor and that, instead, contribute to expanding social inequalities'. As argued by Bils and Klenow, countries that are richer, faster growing and with developed social and physical structures find it easier

to increase their educational spend thereby reaching higher educational attainment levels. Therefore, correlations depicted between educational spend, educational attainment and economic prosperity are in all likelihood due to a reverse causality where the existing economic wealth of the nation has created the country's educational attainment, rather than – as policy makers have been assuming – that educational attainment has created the wealth of the country.

While education might not 'matter' in the way that 'governments expect them to' (i.e. through economic growth and increased productivity), the more education an individual acquires, the higher their income is likely to be, and the less likely they will be to experience unemployment, argues Wolf. In short, at the individual level, all evidence is that education pays in that it dramatically increases the probability of being employed and the wage income of individuals. Branson and others found that individuals with some tertiary study are between two to three times more likely than matriculants to be formally employed and with earning potentials of between 170% and 220% higher than those with a matriculation. The findings of Branson and others are supported by an earlier study by Wittenberg, and later by Dinkelman and Pirouz and also by Ardington, and others. Together these studies show a consensus of the protective value of education with an inverse relationship existing between an increase in the level of qualification and a decrease in the probability of employment.

Banerjee and others, however, show that the protection provided by education is not constant. There is clear evidence that the benefits of having a matric is in steady decline. The participation of matriculants in the labour force declined from 54% to 49.7% during the period 1995 to 2005 and the unemployment rate

for matriculants doubled from 15.2% to 28.2%. The main reason for this is the increase in the total number of matriculants entering the labour force which has resulted in the labour market having more matrices and therefore, has served to devalue the matriculation as a labour market qualification. Studies on education in Europe show that qualification escalation over the past two decades has resulted in the protection provided by matriculation disappearing and that provided by higher education declining significantly and, in contexts like Portugal, completely eroding. The problem of qualification escalation in the South African context is further supported by StatsSA that identified that youths are spending more and more time in education to try and protect at an individual level from unemployment.

CONTESTED ROLE OF VE

Despite these arguments, and clear labour market evidence of a decline of jobs in the private sector, the notion of the 'responsive' college is deeply embedded in South African vocational education policy, argues Wedekind. A key aspect of TVET college responsiveness is the formation of college partnerships. The most common reasons advanced for partnerships is to narrow the gap between TVET and the world of work through ensuring the relevance of the TVET curriculum to the labour market, enabling student and lecturer placements in Work Integrated Learning (WIL) and improving the absorption of graduates into the workplace. The White Paper for Post-School Education and Training, the National Development Plan and the Human Resources Development (HRD) Strategy all underscore the importance of strong working partnerships between the TVET colleges and employers. Strategic goal 2.3 of the HRD Strategy, for example, makes reference to the importance of industry-institutional

partnerships by stating that 'each Further Education and Training Institution [should have] at least one functional and sustainable industry-institution partnership aimed at enhancing the link between formal learning and the world of work and providing opportunities for placements'.

Currently, and as shown by Human Resource Development Council of South Africa (HRDCSA) all TVET colleges in the country are involved in partnership projects. These partnerships include with large national companies and with local small businesses, with national and local government departments, with national and international colleges and with higher education institutions and with Sector Education and Training Authorities (Setas). In a review of the TVET college sector done last year for HRDCSA I show that 'the number of partnership projects differs markedly between colleges and between provinces with the college mean ranging from 3 to 150 partnership projects and the national mean being 39 partnership projects per college'.

Furthermore, I noted that the study of college partnerships which I took on behalf of the Department of Education in 2003 showed that more than a decade ago every college in the country had existent partnerships. Drawing from this, I conclude in this report that the historic existence of college-industry partnerships together with the current partnerships that are in place 'begs the question asked by the HRDCSA (2014), which is: "if TVET colleges are enmeshed in partnerships as it appears in the literature, then why are they struggling to win the confidence of students, parents and industry?" Extending on this question, one could also ask why students are struggling to source internship placements and why graduate employment rates continue to be unsatisfactory?'

Recognising the decline of jobs in the formal sector, one argument put forward is that the problem of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, is one caused by a mismatch between the skills composition of the labour force and the requirements of industry. The argument is that the shedding of low skill jobs has led to a change in the skills composition of the unemployed and the employed with a significant change away from lower skill labour towards the absorption of higher skill labour. This has then contributed to the decline in unskilled labour and the expansion in demand for semi-skilled and skilled labour leading to a widening gap between the skill levels of the employed and that of the unemployed.

This has led to the idea that developing the 'right' skill mix within the labour force will address unemployment through resolving what has been termed the 'skills mismatch' problem. Further, that this will, in turn, address high levels of unemployment. However, in the absence of large scale vacancies at semi-skilled and skilled levels, which Dias and Posel can find 'little evidence of', it is unlikely that higher skill levels will create employment and more likely that higher skills will result in qualification escalation with employers increasing their demand for qualifications that are irrelevant to the task(s) that the employee needs to undertake. As argued by Levine the consensus among top economists in the face of the evidence is that the skills gap is a myth. High unemployment is mainly the result of a deficiency in aggregate demand and slow economic growth, not because workers lack the right education or skills.

Another position that has gained favour with policy is the suggestion that the TVET colleges be targeted towards training for the informal sector. This is against a backdrop of the majority of new jobs between 1997 and 2003 (60% according to Casale and others) having been

created in the informal sector. The idea of orientating the TVET colleges towards the informal sector raises some concern for equity. The inequality existing in the informal sector is captured by Banerjee who argues that the informal sector is characterised as the second-best alternative for those who are unable to access the formal sector because incomes are significantly lower in the informal sector and self-employment is a much less stable state than regular employment with retention rates low and with a higher incidence of transitioning to unemployment than transitioning to formal sector employment.

Contrary then to advocates who see the informal sector, according to Davies, 'as a beehive of ambitious entrepreneurs yearning for formal property rights and unregulated competitive spaces' the reality is that those functioning in the informal sector exist for the most part as the 'active[ly] unemployed'. Living precariously, and often furtively, on the periphery of cities in fragiley claimed land spaces they are everywhere subjected to exploitation: they are universally underpaid, work for the most part outside the protections provided by labour laws and work safety regulations and have little, if any, job security.

Despite these realities, the emphasis on the supply side of the equation has led to the TVET colleges being severely criticised for not delivering on its mandate of making a more meaningful contribution to unemployment. A report from the *City Press*, for example, titled 'Young, Jobless and Desperate - will FET Colleges Fix Our Future' quotes a young FET college student: 'You come to an FET college looking for a better future for you and for your family but ... there's quite a lot of sadness and disappointment'. Another media article by Cosser titled, 'FET colleges fail, lays the problem directly at the door of the TVET colleges' by discussing 'shortcomings at college level'.

This critique of vocational education as inefficient and ineffective and as not delivering the 'appropriate' and 'relevant' skills required by the labour market is a global phenomenon with education and training blamed for not supplying the skills required for firm productivity and for economic growth and thereby not responding to youth unemployment, poverty and increasing social inequities. In this logic, 'the cause of unemployment, in general, is put at education's door, more broadly arguing that education is not teaching what the economy wants,' writes Klees.

PROMISING ALTERNATIVES

So where does this leave the colleges? Commenting on the dominant orthodoxy and the need for alternatives, McGrath argues that it is time to begin 'building beyond the narrow theoretical orthodoxy'. Vocational education, both in South Africa and internationally, has suffered an 'impoverishment of theory'. This is partly because research on VE and equally so on South African TVET colleges has been scanty, underdeveloped and undertaken for the most part by consultants and think-tanks funded through government or government linked projects but also because of the dominance of the VET orthodoxy.

Despite this dominance, a number of promising alternatives exist, all of which require further work and more rigorous engagement to examine the value and benefits that they might have for what I termed 're-imagining of the purpose of Vocational Education and Training'. These paradigms include critical pedagogies such as Freire's emancipatory work on education where he argues for education being the means by which people are enabled to critically understand, engage with and transform their worlds. Philosophical arguments in the liberal education tradition such as that made by Dewey and Lewis that argue for the dignity of a truly vocational education and



Busy at work: The skills mismatch idea is a myth. Credit: William Matlala.

that of philosophers such as Sennett and Winch who challenge the role and understanding of 'skills' in the vocational education by arguing for the broader notion of 'craft'. Sociological work such as that undertaken by Willis that provides an analysis of the role that skills plays in class reproduction and ethnographic work such as that undertaken by Rose that critiques the 'hand' and 'mind' distinction.

Work located in political economy such as that undertaken by Ashton & Green, Crouch, Finegold, and Sako and more locally, by Allais, that emphasises the importance of locating skills within social, political and economic contexts. Work located in development studies such as that undertaken by McGrath & Powell and by Powell who bring a human development (or capability approach) lens to the theorisation of VE to argue that social justice, human rights, and poverty alleviation be brought to the forefront of VE policy. These frameworks come to the topic from different directions, but together they negate the trickle down logic of neo-liberalism, shred the underlying assumptions of human capital and serve as powerful ammunition for the reconceptualisation of the

purpose of VE in addressing poverty, unemployment and inequality.

In an attempt to develop further the theoretical base, the work of the Research Chair: Youth Unemployment and Empowerment will be focusing on the role that VE can play in advancing the solidarity economy. In the face of a decline in the formal labour market, particularly for the private sector, and with large numbers of people excluded from the formal labour market, the focus is on exploring the ecovillages as a viable policy solution to poverty and examining the role that education and training can play in further advancing the ecovillages. Following the Senegalese approach which has committed to transforming 14,000 villages to eco-villages, the focus will be on the viability of the eco-villages as a policy solution to poverty, but also on the role that education and training can play in expanding and further building the solidarity economy through supporting the eco-villages.

A five component proposal has been developed to address this research agenda. Together the five components allow a number of critical questions to be asked of VE policy:

- (1) What does this mean for the policy agenda for VET?
- (2) What does it mean for VET partnerships?
- (3) Is it possible to forge college-community partnerships where internships are located in functional and stronger ecovillages?
- (4) What does it mean for WIL? Could we conceptualise WIL as happening between colleges and communities in college-community partnerships, rather than as college-industry as they are currently perceived? Underlying these questions, is a deeper set of questions which relate to the current orientation of South Africa's TVET colleges.
- (5) In particular, it raises questions as to what this means for the pedagogy, lecturing training and the general purpose of South Africa's public TVET colleges? ^{LB}

Lesley Powell is the newly established Chair for Youth Unemployment at the Centre for Integrated Post School Education and Training at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.

Social media: Be careful

While complaining about your job or discussing your somewhat controversial views may seem harmless when amongst a group of friends, doing so on your social media profiles could leave you jobless and battling to secure a steady income. This is according to **Kay Vittee**, chief executive officer of Quest Staffing Solutions – who highlights that, although there have been numerous examples of people losing their jobs and/or being publically scrutinised for posting or sharing inappropriate or discriminatory comments online, social media users keep putting themselves in hot water.

‘Considering that social media has transformed every aspect of our lives, it should come as no surprise that the job-market is no exception.’

Vittee refers to a recent Harris Poll which found that 52% of employers use social networking sites to research candidates.

‘Ultimately, what you say online – stays online and these platforms are often very easily accessible for another regular user to view.’

‘According to CareerBuilder, 51% of employers that screen via social media reject applicants based solely on their profiles. This means that, if you don’t want your current or prospective employer to know your political views or what you got up to over the weekend, you may want to keep these details off of your timeline. After all, you want to stand out – for professional reasons – rather than stand up ... in a disciplinary hearing,’ she explains.

Over the past few years, social media uptake has increased drastically with a recent South

African Social Media Landscape 2016 study conducted by World Wide Worx and Fuseware revealing that, in the last year alone, Facebook use increased by 8%, from 12-million to 13-million users, Twitter by 12%, from 6,6-million to 7,4-million users, YouTube by 15%, from 7,2-million to 8,28-million users, and Instagram, with a staggering 133%, from 1,1-million to 2,68-million users.

Vittee says, ‘With such massive numbers online on a daily basis, it is becoming common practice for recruiters to use sites like LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest and Instagram not only to attract and recruit top talent but also to do a little investigating about who they are really putting forward to a client organisation and whether or not they will suit the company’s culture and values.’

‘Likewise, candidates are using social media to search for jobs, and network and connect with industry influencers. Gone are the days of a simple cover letter, CV and

references. Nowadays, job-seekers need to ensure they have a carefully curated digital footprint and take control of what they are putting out there,’ she adds.

Vittee shares a few points South Africans should keep in mind while online:

- **Profile picture:** A picture is worth a thousand words – especially for recruiters and employers scrolling through social media sites. Studies have shown it only takes one-tenth of a second for someone to draw conclusions about you based on your photo. Keeping in mind that social media profile photos are often visible to all who search for you – keep it clean and portray yourself the way you would on an ordinary workday.
- **Get some professional online:** While there are a few professional ‘dangers’ associated to social media, it is a good idea to build yourself some professional profiles on online networking sites like LinkedIn.

... it is becoming common practice for recruiters to use sites like LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest and Instagram not only to attract and recruit top talent but also to do a little investigating ...

This will help you build your professional brand and get you known in your industry. Consider joining industry groups, start sharing relevant content and connect with like-minded professionals.

- **Don't go on a rant:** There is a time and place for everything and online is definitely not the place to talk badly about your boss or colleagues. Also, stay clear of religious or political rants.
- **Be secure:** If you want to have a personal profile that you just want your friends and family to be able to access, check your security settings and be aware of auto-geotagging.

It is also important to consider that while recruiters have a growing presence online, so do scam artists. Always make sure you know who you are talking to when connecting with individuals online and don't share personal information with anyone you are unable to verify.

'My advice to job-seekers is always to think before they post and use social media to your advantage.'

'You may think no one is watching - but you can never be 100% sure,' concludes Vittee. ^{LB}

Unlocking labour laws

A reasonable error of law?

A commissioner at the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) can be wrong, but not unreasonably so. **Anton Myburgh and Craig Bosch** explain what this means.

As the saying goes, 'an arbitrator has the right to be wrong'. However, an adaptation is required when it comes to CCMA arbitration. As the landmark *Sidumo* case (*Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others* [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC)) tells us, a commissioner has the right to be wrong, but not unreasonably so. At least notionally, this also applies to material errors of law.

So it could be argued that while a commissioner, for example, misinterpreted the Labour Relations Act (LRA), her decision was not so wrong as to be unreasonable. But to allow this would be to saddle the losing party with an award which is wrong in law and thus, in effect, unlawful.

In two recent unreported judgments of the Labour Appeal Court (LAC), the question arose whether, in order to succeed with a review against an award based on an error of law, the

applicant must establish that the result was unreasonable. In the first case, *Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa (Denosa) obo Du Toit and another v Western Cape Department of Health and others* [2016] JOL 36183 (LAC), the LAC found it unnecessary to make a final decision on the issue. But Davis JA gave a strong indication that a material error of law is, in itself, a basis for review without the *Sidumo* test having to be met: '... a material error of law committed by an arbitrator may, on its own without having to apply the exact formulation set out in *Sidumo*, justify a review and setting aside of the award depending on the facts as established in the particular case.'

In the second case, *Macdonald's Transport Upington (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (Amcu) and others* [2016] JOL 36184 (LAC), the LAC was less ambivalent, with Sutherland JA finding:



‘... there is much to be said for the proposition that an arbitrator in the CCMA or in a bargaining council forum who wrongly interprets an instrument commits a reviewable irregularity as envisaged in section 145 of the LRA, i.e. a reasonable arbitrator does not get a legal point wrong. If so, the reasonableness test is appropriate to both value judgments and legal interpretations. If not, “correctness” as a distinct test is necessary to address such matters. However, on either basis, the ruling in this case must be set aside.’

In effect, the LAC here hedged its bets - either an error of law is per se unreasonable or, if not, an error of law should be subjected to correctness review (as errors of jurisdiction, powers and procedural fairness are).

The finding that an error of law may be subject to correctness review is not controversial, because parties to CCMA arbitration have the right to administrative action that is lawful, which constitutional standard has been found - like reasonableness - to suffuse s 145 (*Arends v South African Local Government Bargaining Council* [2015] 1 BLLR 23 (LAC)


at paragraph 19). An award based on a material error of law probably cannot be lawful, and could thus be reviewed as a gross irregularity (as suffused by the constitutional standard of lawfulness). A comparable approach was adopted in *Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of South African Trade Unions as amicus curiae)* [2013] 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA), where the SCA expanded the meaning of a gross irregularity to cover unreasonableness. By parity of reasoning, it can be expanded to cover unlawfulness.

Accordingly, there is no need to resort to reasonableness in order to review an award based on an error of law. But if this was considered necessary, such an award would be unreasonable on the following basis. The law recognises a variable standard (or sliding scale) of reasonableness review, with it being arguable that the standard of reasonableness applicable to questions of law equates to correctness. Seen in this way, an incorrect award based on a material error of law is unreasonable. This is not a test distinct from reasonableness (as found in *MacDonald’s Transport*), but is instead the standard of reasonableness that applies to errors of law. In short, a CCMA award based on a material error of law is unreasonable.

In line with this, there is Canadian authority for the fact that an incorrect interpretation of a statute (constituting an error of law) is unreasonable. As the court stated, ‘it seems incompatible with the rule of law that two contradictory interpretations of the same provision of a public statute, by which citizens order their lives, could both be accepted as reasonable’ (*Altus Group Ltd v Calgary (City)* 2015 ABCA 86).

But irrespective of the ground upon which an award based on a material error of law stands to be reviewed, we can expect further controversy as courts grapple with which errors of law are material and which are ‘mere errors of ... law [which are] not enough to vitiate the award’ (*Head of the Department of Education v Mofokeng* [2015] 1 BLLR 50 (LAC)).

This is one dimension of an area of law that is complex and variable. Given that review applications constitute the bulk of the work of the Labour Court it is useful to take stock and assess what the law relating to reviews is and how it might be developed in the future.

A new legal title from LexisNexis South Africa addresses these proceedings. *Reviews in the Labour Courts* provides excellent guidance for labour practitioners and is a must-have manual for all labour lawyers, advocates, judges, CCMA commissioners, bargaining council arbitrators, unions, HR/IR practitioners, in-house counsel, lecturers and post-graduate students. Published by LexisNexis South Africa, the book *Reviews in the Labour Courts* is authored by Anton Myburgh and Craig Bosch. 

Anton Myburgh, BJuris LLB is a senior counsel at the Johannesburg Bar (Sandton), adjunct professor of law at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU), past national president of SASLAW; sometime acting judge of the Labour Court.

Craig Bosch, BA LLB (Stellenbosch) LLM (University of Cape Town) is an advocate at the Cape Bar; research associate at NMMU, former senior lecturer in labour law at UWC, former senior commissioner of the CCMA and bargaining council panellist.

On the value chain

Numsa as shield and spear of struggling workers

In one of the discussion documents presented to the **National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa)** at the Special National Congress in 2013 was one that emphasised the importance of organising along value chains. The document argued that this was critical because of changing trends under the globalisation of work.

The world of capitalist production has changed. In the past two decades the changing nature of work has had a significant impact on collective bargaining. Global trends have shown there are fewer large companies which manufacture and assemble products and provide all their own services under one roof. Instead, there is a value chain of separate companies manufacturing components and providing services to the final assembly plant.

For example, in the auto industry, as a result of changes in both global and domestic value chains, power has shifted significantly from the components sector to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). As a result, workers in the components industries have witnessed reduced power to win and maintain decent working conditions as OEMs have continued to squeeze margins. Furthermore, in today's economy, the increased outsourcing of key functions such as logistics and transportation by many major companies has increasingly made it difficult for unions to bargain effectively.

CONTRACTING AND OUTSOURCING

Global companies have embarked on strategies that allow for a greater percentage of production and manufacturing to be provided by contract manufacturers and through outsourcing, thereby cutting off workers who were traditionally represented by existing unions. The situation is complicated by mergers and acquisitions, changing ownership patterns, plant closures, movement into services, over-capacity, relocation of production, high rate of precarious employment and redundancies.

It has increasingly become the norm to find workers from different companies working in one production line or assembly. As a result of these vast changes in the field of production, the principle of one industry one union has become difficult to adhere to.

In light of the changing nature of major industries and the increased casualisation of work, workers' only hope of getting more value for their labour is to collectively push back against the upper levels of the value chain and demand a redistribution of the value that is created by the collective value chain. It is therefore critical for the union to analyse value chains. Such an analysis will enable us to


organise in the value chains so we have the power to disrupt them.

Numsa also argued that workers outside its scope wanted to join the union. In addition to the challenge of the changing nature of the structure of industries and the continued blurring of industry classifications, the union is confronted with the challenge of how to respond to workers who want to become members of Numsa but however fall outside the union's scope.

Some Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) affiliates have experienced severe difficulty in servicing and supporting their members. This has resulted in the growth of unions such as Association of Mining and Construction Union (Amcu) and the National Transport Movement (NTM), which are breakaways from the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (Satawu). Some of the workers have approached Numsa for support.

Although we understand Cosatu's policy of one industry, one union, it is hard to turn away workers whose only alternative is to join a non-Cosatu union or to remain with no union to support them at all.

Structure of the value chain in the automotive industry



UNION RESPONSE

In the last 20 years most unions have sought to deal with these challenges through mergers and Numsa is not the only union to consider changing its organisational scope. For example, our sister union in Germany, the IG Metall (IGM), initiated similar discussions. Some experiences can also be drawn by considering the broad scope of our sister unions in Sweden and the United Kingdom.

IGM undertook a process of re-organising its membership base as a result of developments and changes in the metal sector. About 30 years ago product development, assembly, and sales and marketing of a product were integrated into single enterprises. Today huge parts of the value chain consist of many different component suppliers and service companies. This development is part of the concept of lean production, which aims at tighter value chains with greater flexibility and cost reduction through outsourcing. Some of these outsourced jobs are defined as services, which form integral parts of the value chain.

IG Metall is confronted with outsourcing in all big and medium-sized industrial plants. Similar to labour broking, employees of outsourced companies often work directly in the plant of the client, the OEM. IG Metall has managed to regulate labour broking in collective bargaining agreements, but employers try to undermine these agreements through increasing the use of outsourcing and contracts in work and services.

Lower qualified jobs are affected most by outsourcing, for example in work canteens and cleaning services. However, outsourcing is also prevalent in high qualified jobs like engineering, research and information technology. Big companies worldwide are now specialising in offering industry-orientated services, ranging from information technology to high-value development services, from maintenance and repair and logistics to in-plant assembly.



Marching in Johannesburg: Workers outside Numsa's traditional scope now joining the union.

Near to big industrial enterprises, industrial parks are developing, which offer their services on the OEM's factory premises. This development is further accelerated through far reaching processes of transformation in technology, operations and material.

As development, assembly, sales and marketing of products is no longer done by one company and is increasingly outsourced to component suppliers and sub-contractors, the conventional definition of what constitutes an industry or a sector no longer corresponds with reality.

CHALLENGES AT IG METALL

Capital's intention is to reduce one-fifth or up to one-third of its core employees in the manufacturing sector through labour broking, outsourcing and contracts for work and services. This leads to a division of workers into core and non-core workers who often work on the same premises or very near to each other. As a result of this drive to increase outsourcing, working conditions of non-core workers have been on a downward slope and collective bargaining agreements are being undermined through low-cost suppliers. One effect of outsourcing is that workers earn up to 60% less than what they were earning before as employees in the metal and engineering industry. Therefore the power of unions and work councils is reduced to core areas and there are more outsourced workers without union representation.

The expansion of work in the non-core areas also puts pressure on the working conditions of core workers. Therefore, collective bargaining agreements and working conditions for workers in the core areas will also continue to decrease if unions are not successful in developing a collective bargaining strategy for core workers and non-core workers jointly. There is an increasing danger that workers in

the core and the non-core areas regard each other as rivals and do not perceive conflicts about distribution with the employer as joint struggles for better working conditions. This negatively affects worker solidarity. The membership of IG Metall, based on a decreasing number of workers in the core, will decline if the union does not start preventing or regulating outsourcing and organising non-core workers.

IG METALL STRATEGIES

IG Metall wants to avoid a situation, where at the end of the day, there are only few core workers left responsible for sticking the logo on the car and everything else is outsourced in low-paid, non-unionised sectors. So the union started studying the value chains and suggesting the union that is at present responsible for the end product of a value chain should also recruit all workers belonging to the same value chain. For example, if new sectors are developing out of the automotive sector, these new sectors or outsourced companies should be organised by IG Metall.

IG Metall therefore needs to determine 'who belong to our value chains' and is in the process of developing a better understanding of how industrial manufacturing and services are interlinked and connected, with the intention of re-organising its membership scope by saying 'every worker that is part of the value chain belongs to us.'

It is necessary to regulate the whole value chain. Firstly, it plans to push OEMs to agree to minimum standards as binding pre-conditions for contracts with service providers. Secondly, IG Metall aims to regulate industry-orientated services through collective bargaining agreements with the aim of linking or leading these to the central collective bargaining agreement in the sector.

An alternative, because of the differing conditions, could be to aim at a new central bargaining agreement for industry-orientated services. The union needs to develop a strategy to prevent or complicate outsourcing in the future.

IG Metall rejects in principle all outsourcing which affects the core competencies of an enterprise, which operates on the basis of sham contracts or which leads to decreasing working conditions. In cases of outsourcing, IG Metall needs to ensure that collective bargaining agreements exist to secure equal working conditions at the workplace and to secure co-determination and cooperation between works councils in outsourced companies and in OEMs.

It is necessary to start union projects aimed at recruiting in new and less unionised sectors in the non-core areas. By organising labour broker staff, the IGM has shown that it's possible to recruit in non-unionised sectors and that these can be regulated through collective bargaining agreements to guarantee fair working conditions and better wages.

The driving force of organising are work council members and shop stewards in the core areas in OEMs. They are able to speak to workers in the non-core areas, activate and organise them and expose their working conditions. Together they will be able to increase pressure on employers and to enforce better working conditions. A coordinated approach is necessary, including research, identification of essential companies for recruitment, concept development and implementation.

IG Metall managed to organise two logistic service providers and to achieve bargaining agreements. In Schnellecker, a company which provides services to Volkswagen and is located in Zwickau in the

province of Sachsen, IG Metall organises 80% of the 1,200 employees. It needs to be pointed out that so far Schnellecke had been organised by ver.di, a union, which organises in the public and private service sector. The takeover by IG Metall has increased conflicts between the two unions, who belong to same federation. In addition, IG Metall admits that despite these two regional organising successes, there is no coherent strategy yet.

SCOPE OF IF METALL – SWEDEN

IF Metall is the second largest affiliate of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation. It was formed in a 2006 as a merger between the Swedish Industrial Union and Swedish Metal Workers Union. Unlike in Germany where the focus has been on organising along value chain, our sister union in Sweden has extended its scope. IF Metall has 400,000 members and organises in the following sectors:

- Metal Mining Chemicals
- Pharmaceuticals Automotive Component
- Plastics Glass Clothing.

UNITE – UNITED KINGDOM

UNITE is Britain's biggest union with 1,42-million members. The union was established in 2007 through mergers in which smaller and more specialised unions came together to combine their resources and increase their bargaining power and collective strength. An important feature of UNITE is that the union has a community membership initiative. It welcomes into its ranks those not in employment into the union, and it builds on the strength of organising which is changing the face of the trade union movement.

UNITE organises in 23 sectors:

1. Aerospace and shipbuilding
2. Chemicals, pharmaceuticals
3. Civil air transportation
4. Community and youth work
5. Construction

6. Docks, rail, ferries and waterways
7. Education sector (research, technical staff, IT staff, administrative, estate, maintenance staff)
8. Electrical engineering and electronics
9. Food, drink and tobacco
10. Finance, legal, banking and insurance
11. Graphical paper and media
12. Energy and utilities
13. Health sector
14. IT and communication
15. Local authorities
16. Manufacturing
17. Metals
18. Defence, prisons and royal mint
19. Motor component
20. Passenger transport
21. Road transport commercial
22. Rural and agricultural sector
23. Servicing and general.

OPTIONS FOR POSITIONING NUMSA

The options for Numsa are: One Industry, One Union: Reject 'core' and 'non-core' in which it would work within and reaffirm Cosatu's principle of 'one union, one industry' and reject the employer's principle of 'core and non-core' business.

Most companies now outsource areas which they consider non-core, like the canteen, cleaning and security, machine maintenance, warehousing and transport. We should organise all workers 'core and non-core', white collar and blue collar, into Numsa.

This could include the following areas: canteen, security, machine maintenance, warehousing, transport, shop staff in garages. Many of those jobs used to be occupied by Numsa members. Their work is part of the value chain of the companies where they work. They only ever left our industries because of an outsourcing system which we have always rejected and resisted.

This approach allows for the phasing out of outsourcing and the creation of one strong union in a workplace and worker unity. It adheres to the 'one industry, one union' principle of the federation's resolutions. It would mean that we could launch a total onslaught and invest our maximum focus on the attainment of greater representation in the sectors in which we are currently organised and address our weaknesses that see us as not having majority representation in certain sectors.

The question of the continued unity of the federation will also resonate with this scenario, as the union will not be seen to be giving ammunition to attack by those who are currently, for one reason or the other, attempting to weaken or divide the union.

SECTORAL UNION

Another option would be for Numsa to persuade Cosatu to move away from an industrial approach to organising and towards a 'value chain' approach. Cosatu's 6th Congress already opened the pathway to this form of organisation when it resolved (even though it was never carried out) to create groups of unions called 'cartels', including a 'manufacturing' cartel. The job of the cartels was to 'take responsibility for defining sector policy, take responsibility for collective bargaining and set parameters for all other union work of national competence.'

We already have members who fall into this category: petrol station attendants do not have a 'trade' and are not 'metalworkers', but are 'general workers' within the value chain of the motor industry. We already made a beginning to such an approach with the proposed amendment from the 2012 Congress on petrochemicals to include refineries, drivers of tankers and pipeline employees.

In auto we should look at motor-ferry drivers and workers who manufacture seat covers and even industrial clothing. Mining of gold, platinum and iron ore, for example, are also clearly part of the metal industry value chain. It may be that our 2012 decision to add jewelry and the refining of base and precious metals and related work including extractive processes will inevitably lead us into mining.

Value chains for Numsa could be: petrochemicals, oil pipe lines, petrol and diesel depots, building and construction, energy, upholstery, scaffolding, nuclear, hydro, production, sale, and fitment of glass components including windscreens and fitment centres, car valet and wash bay establishments, and precious metal group beneficiation.

This approach would face three challenges. Firstly, we may struggle to meet the required membership threshold of the new bargaining councils. Secondly, there will be resistance from other unions whose membership is affected. Lastly, such an agenda may have the unintended consequence of sowing disunity within the federation and Tripartite Alliance.

However, it is clear that members of other unions are voting with their feet and coming to our offices for answers. These workers need representation and if we do not accept them we will cast them into the wilderness of non-unionism or, worse still, opportunistic organisations which will spring up.

HYBRID UNION

Development in South Africa has been uneven; some provinces develop faster than others with huge investment in the manufacturing industry which employs a large number of workers. In these provinces population growth has also increased significantly. Many people are employed and labour is better organised.



Wearing many hats: A worker wearing an Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union beret and an Economic Freedom Fighters t-shirt poses with a Numsa poster at Marikana.

However, we also have provinces in this country where development is very slow and no industrial development is taking place. In these provinces, like the Northern Cape, which are big and vast you have high levels of unemployment and many people depend on subsistence farming and the informal economy. The underdeveloped provinces pose serious challenges for unions. A union like Numsa will never be strong as a sector/industrial union; its relevance in those provinces becomes questionable.

Unions should also begin accepting this reality if they want to be relevant and adapt to the ever changing situation. It is therefore important to begin a discussion about how to keep Numsa relevant in these provinces. One proposal is

that the union can be an industrial or sectoral union in provinces like Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North West, and a semi-general or general union in provinces like Northern Cape.

Hybrid unions are becoming common especially in the United States. Such unions have been shown to operate effectively and provide proper service to members. The majority of these unions operate in the south and are coordinated by non-governmental organisations. ¹⁸

This article is an edited version of a paper titled 'Positioning Numsa as a shield and spear of the struggling workers' (December 2013) that was presented at the Special National Congress in Johannesburg and was written 11 months before Numsa's expulsion from Cosatu on 8 November 2014.

Shop steward shot dead

Samwu Gauteng condemns barbaric act

In a media statement **Nonceba Mbilini** explains the circumstances leading to the shooting to death of Elliot Manyosi, a shop steward from the City of Johannesburg's refuse collection company Pikitup, outside the South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu) House in Johannesburg on 29 July 2016.

Members of Samwu at Pikitup attending a scheduled general meeting to receive feedback on the implementation and progress of the Political Facilitated Agreement (PFA) on salary increases at Pikitup ran in all directions as bouncers at the union's head office started shooting at them. Upon arrival the workers had been denied access to the hall at Samwu House where they normally used to hold their meetings.

Shop stewards then resorted to convening the meeting outside the head office where they addressed members and reported on the state of the organisation to members. They also informed the meeting on how they were repeatedly being disrespected by individuals who continued to expel members including elected shop stewards.

This was after the bouncers, hired by the national office and paid from workers' subscriptions, had shown

them a letter expelling Esther Mtatyana, the deputy chairperson of Pikitup. The letter was written by Caleb Mokoena, former provincial secretary of the Gauteng province. Members, who are the owners of the building, demanded to know why their general meeting was being held outside, and resolved to move inside the building peacefully and requested the bouncers to leave the building as their services were not required.



Comrade Elliot Manyosi, a shop steward, was killed outside Samwu House in a hail of bullets while another shop steward, comrade Petrus Bophela, was wounded and taken to hospital in a critical condition. Police were called to the scene, and six of the bouncers were arrested but three remained at the building after they refused to leave.

The bouncers then obliged to the request of members and left the building as requested but only to come back after a few minutes when workers had started disbanding. The bouncers started randomly firing at the members that were dispersing and re-entered the building chasing those members who were still inside. Some members managed to escape through the ground floor bathroom windows.

Comrade Elliot Manyosi, a shop steward, was killed outside Samwu House in a hail of bullets while another shop steward, comrade Petrus Bophela, was wounded and taken to hospital in a critical condition. Police were called to the scene, and six of the bouncers were arrested but three remained at the building after they refused to leave.

The Gauteng provincial branch of Samwu strongly condemns the barbaric act of these hired hitmen that have made it their business to carry out instructions to harm our members and help destroy Samwu. We hold responsible the

Cosatu shocked by tragic killing

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) is deeply shocked and alarmed by the reports of the death of a South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu) member, following scuffles outside the union head offices in Johannesburg on 29 July.

This follows a general meeting, where Samwu members were picketing outside the union's head offices. Cosatu harshly condemns this unnecessary killing of a worker and a member. We are calling for law enforcement agencies to apprehend the perpetrator/s and ensure they face the full might of the law. There is no justification for use of violence to resolve disputes, especially amongst workers themselves.

We send our heartfelt condolences to the families, friends and colleagues of the deceased member.

It is deeply regrettable that disagreements amongst workers and union members have resulted in a worker losing his life and a family losing a breadwinner. The federation is calling for calm and will be engaging with all affected parties to investigate the source of this tragedy. We will also continue with the Central Executive Committee (CEC)-led intervention process to reconcile the disagreeing factions within the union. We are issuing a call to all Samwu members and leaders at all levels to rally behind the union. Leaders at all levels should put the union and workers first at this difficult time for the union. Violence is not the answer and let's all try to use dialogue and constructive engagements to resolve our differences. ^{LB}

Congress of South African Trade Unions national office bearers

handlers of the bouncers for the death of the comrade and trust that the law will take its course and bring all those responsible in the killing of a fellow member and leader to book.

The Gauteng provincial branch will not be silenced by expelled national office bearers (Pule Molalenyane (president), John Dlamini (first deputy president), Portia Lindi (treasurer), and Simon Mathe (general secretary)) who

are still holding on to power at the cost of workers' lives. We call for calm from our members to allow the law to take its course.

May his soul rest in peace. *Hamba kable Qabane Manyosi* and we wish a speedy recovery to comrade Bophela. ^{LB}

Nonceba Mbilini is provincial secretary of Samwu Gauteng. This article is based on an edited media statement.

Killing of worker outrageous

The **National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa)** is shocked and angry at the murder of a Pikitup worker belonging to the South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu), and the serious wounding of another, after security guards allegedly opened fire on union members outside the Samwu head office in Johannesburg.

It is outrageous that Samwu leaders are employing private security staff to brutally attack their own members in such a barbaric fashion. While welcoming the police's arrest of a number of people after the shooting, Numsa demands that not only the shooters but the officials under whose orders they were responsible be brought to justice for these crimes.

Samwu's provincial secretary, Nonceba Mbilini, told *Independent Media* that members had convened at the union headquarters to get feedback about the state of the organisation and what progress the union had made since calling off a month-long unprotected strike in April.

'Samwu members wanted to go inside the building,' she said, 'to attend the meeting which had been requested even from the City. But instead, the bouncers physically stopped and harassed them. The bouncers ended up pulling out their guns and shooting randomly into the crowd. A shop steward from the Roodepoort depot was shot and died on the

scene while another Pikitup employee was wounded and taken to hospital.'

Numsa agrees totally with her that 'Our members are paying the salaries of these people yet they refuse to be accountable to them about how their contributions are spent. This [security] company was paid R700,000 in May just to protect Pule Molalenyane and other officials.'

This outrage follows a long battle for the control of Samwu. Its regional deputy secretary Paul Tlhabang reiterated Mbilini's sentiments and, according to *Independent Media*, also accused 'certain individuals' of having hijacked the union for nefarious reasons ... Samwu had been operating under a cloud of fear since its national office bearers were 'holding the union to ransom' after they were removed from office for allegedly stealing more than R140-million from Samwu.

Deputy general secretary Moses Miya, a legal officer, Surprise Mnisi and Zukiswa Ntsiko, a finance administrator are out on bail and

facing charges of fraud and theft. Earlier this year, Samwu expelled its president, Pule Molalenyane, first deputy president, John Dlamini and its national treasurer, Portia Lindi, following a decision taken during its central executive committee meeting in March. But all of them have stuck to their positions.

Two new breakaway unions, the Democratic Municipal and Allied Trade Union of South Africa and Municipal and Allied Trade Union of South Africa, have been formed, are recruiting members of Samwu and have joined the campaign for a new union federation. Numsa urges them to unite and launch a massive drive to recruit thousands more who will have been appalled by this latest crime against the membership.

Finally, Numsa sends its condolences to the family and fellow workers of the murdered worker and best wishes to the injured for a full and speedy recovery. ^{LB}

Patrick Craven is acting spokesperson for Numsa.

Cling women facilitators

Community educators in Freedom Park

Women facilitators at the centre for Community Literacy and Numeracy Group (Cling) are taking community education to greater heights in Freedom Park. The women are not only educators of literacy and numerous skills but agents of transformation as well, writes **Thamsanqa Hamilton Hukwe**.

Freedom Park is situated about 30 kilometres south of Johannesburg, close to Soweto. It was formed in 1993 after the unbanning of liberation organisations and shortly before the first democratic elections in 1994. At the time, the community in Freedom Park was made up of migrants from the neighbouring hostels and backyards rentals in the industrial areas of Johannesburg. Initially, it was to be developed as part of an expansion of the Devland industrial area. However, since 1993 the occupation by an increasing number of shack dwellers changed Freedom Park into a residential area.

Over the years, it has become a site of resistance to evictions and service delivery protests. As a result, from 2000, three primary schools, a high school and a clinic were built. After 2002, public housing was provided for the community and this led to the recognition of Freedom Park as a formal township.

Freedom Park resembles many communities in South Africa that are excluded from decision-making and feel alienated. On high illiteracy levels, the late ward councillor, Mbuyiselo Dokolwane said:

'... when you don't see a lot of people going to libraries, when you don't see a lot of people reading newspapers, when you don't see newspaper stalls around, when people

do not read their bills, to me it tells that its either they don't like reading or they cannot read. If you see a lot of bills not opened, it tells a story - that they cannot read or write.'

This draws attention to the problem of illiteracy resulting from the socio-economic conditions under which Freedom Park residents live. According to Hoag more than 63% of families live on less than R2,000 per month, and over 80% live on less than R3,000 per month. Of the families that receive social grants, over 70% receive less than R800 per month from the grant. Almost 30% of the families are female-headed households, compared to just 8.1% which are headed by single fathers. At the time of the survey, 12.4% of families had orphans and were not receiving social grants.

This gives a snap shot of the difficult living conditions under which Cling women facilitators run community education programmes.

WOMEN FACILITATORS' CONTRIBUTIONS

Any narrative of Cling in Freedom Park cannot be separated from the experiences and critical contributions of the women facilitators. Not only are the majority of Cling facilitators women, importantly some have been with the group from the very beginning and have since become its lifeblood.

Out of the six women facilitators five are single mothers between the ages of 22 and 45 years. All of them have high school education with a minimum of Grade 10. They also hold part-time jobs as domestic workers in Eldorado Park.

These women constitute the core group of facilitators in terms of the day-to-day administration, operation and implementation of Cling activities. They are bound together by a need to improve their literacy and numeracy skills as well as that of the community. They have also worked in the local schools as assistants and established good working relationships between Cling and the schools.

In the quest to advance their personal development and improve their facilitation skills, they have attended educational workshops and seminars organised by the Centre for Education Rights and Transformation (Cert) based at the University of Johannesburg. As a result they have developed activities such as 'homework assistant', afternoon classes and a drama group with a view to provide learner support programmes. Their role as community educators continue to evolve as they now also provide counselling services to children who experience different kinds of abuse at home. However, they face numerous challenges which they have worked to overcome.

Julia Mamushe, a facilitator, pointed out how workshops and seminars organised by Cert had improved their capabilities to listening with empathy and conducting afternoon classes for learners. She added that 'the training we got from Ivor and Britt helped us with skills to improve our learning activities ... in the afternoon classes'. Ivor Baatjes is the director of the Centre for Integrated Post-School Education & Training at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University while Britt Baatjes is a research associate at Cert.

There is a high level of enthusiasm about Cling among women facilitators. When asked about this Zusange, another facilitator, said 'we feel happy about the work we do in reading clubs because the learners that are attending have improved their reading and writing skills. They can paint the picture and also separate colours'.

The women facilitators have also ensured sustenance of Cling in Freedom Park. This is illustrated when Cling was inactive for eight months in 2009 only to be revived by a highly motivated group of young women facilitators, as observed by Kgobe and Sotuku.

Parents also noted how Cling women facilitators helped them manage stress related to their children's education. When asked about the role of the facilitators, Tsholo, who is a parent, affirms this: 'It helps us as parents because we don't have time and when children are from Cling they come home, done already with their homework'.

Parents also view Cling women facilitators as helping to keep children focused. Said Mncube: 'Cling has really improved the quality of my child's life ... she used to go out playing after school but now from school she goes directly to the Cling centre.' This also shows the transformative aspects based on Cling women's contribution to the community's education.

Similarly, Khumalo said 'Cling plays a very critical role in taking children off the street. There is a lot of 'nyaope' abuse in the area, it is our responsibility as parents to

work hand-in-hand to encourage our children to attend Cling classes and stay off the streets. As you can see, all the medals are proof of her [referring to his daughter] improved performance'. Nyaope is a cheap and highly addictive drug which is a mixture of marijuana, low grade heroin, cocaine and other additives including antiretrovirals used to treat HIV.

Their work has also been appreciated by educators from the local schools who have observed the difference between learners attending Cling activities and those who do not. For Modikwe, an educator at a local school, Cling 'is helping learners even when you check spelling, expression, they differ ... than those who do not attend Cling classes'.

However, even though Cling facilitators are highly motivated by the work they do and the positive effect it has, they operate under very depressing conditions which limits their potential.

Facilitator Patience describes this. 'There are lot of challenges; we do not have financial support to run our programmes. We don't have toilets and access to water. We rely on our neighbour for water. Our place is small since we operate from a container. One part is used as a library, yet we still have to work from there, there is no privacy'.

Khumalo a parent echoes this view: 'Children suffer a lot because the zinc structure is cold in winter, and because the containers are so small, in winter they struggle to fit in ...'

Another facilitator added: 'We are volunteers and do not get paid. In as much as we try to recruit new volunteers we end up losing them because of these challenges. At the end of last year we had 20 something volunteers now we only have seven left ...'

There was a time when Cling facilitators did receive a stipend, but this has ceased. Zusange Hukwe, one of the facilitators, highlighted: 'There was a time when we met and agreed to contribute money and cook for the

children when we were still receiving a stipend from the government.'

Another challenge pointed out is lack of a feeding scheme. 'Most of the children come directly from school and they are usually hungry by the time they get here. Ideally we would have wanted to give them something to eat but we are forced to teach them on an empty stomach which affects their concentration levels. As facilitators we find ourselves helpless since we cannot even offer them a snack to get them to concentrate again.'

Cling facilitators tried to get food for their activities from the local chain stores. However, this has been erratic and some classes were suspended as a result.

CONCLUSION

Cling women facilitators have had a profound effect on community education at Freedom Park. This has been shown by the views shared by women facilitators, parents and teachers as well as children attending Cling activities.

So far, support for Cling has primarily focused on training to improve facilitators' skills. However, Cling activities must also be understood as instruments to analyse power relations in society and to develop educational programmes that respond to the needs of communities. A crucial issue is how this relates to the experiences of women and their agency in addressing the challenges facing the Freedom Park community.

There is also an urgent need to address the difficult conditions in which Cling activities are conducted. Government institutions, in particular the department of education, must support initiatives such as Cling. This can contribute to consolidating the work already done and ensure this can be expanded to address the numerous challenges facing learners in communities like Freedom Park. ¹⁸

Thamsanqa Hamilton Hukwe is a researcher from Cert. This article was first published in the Post-School Education Review 2(1) June 2016.

Worker-student alliances

Anarchist approach missing

Recent worker-student alliances and activities are lacking in an anarchist/syndicalist approach which focuses on ‘people’s power’ and ‘worker control’. Such an approach is important for radical transformation, writes **Leroy Maisiri**.

After 20 years of neo-liberal democracy, South Africa has not truly begun the much-needed purge of race and class structural inequalities and constraints inherited from apartheid South Africa. Many university campuses across the country, since 2015, have been set alight by the actions of a non-compromising body of students. This political wildfire has moved from campus to campus, for a range of reasons: one thing remains central, that tomorrow’s future is shaped by today’s youth, restlessly tackling the structures and impediments that stand in their way.

But what is missing however is a working-class focus and an anarchist/syndicalist approach, a lesson well-taught by the ‘people’s power’ and ‘workers’ control’ initiatives in radical sectors of the 1980s anti-apartheid movement.

BURSARIES AND DECOLONISATION

Earlier in 2015, before and during academic registrations, the Tshwane University of Technology and Walter Sisulu University faced protests around student funding, as did the University of the Witwatersrand, around problems in the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS). At the University of Cape Town

(UCT), by contrast, demands centred on racial justice, framed as ‘decolonisation’, with controversy around a Cecil John Rhodes statue tied to bigger transformation issues. These struggles sparked protests and a week-long occupation of administration buildings at Rhodes University. The ‘open Stellenbosch’ protests raised racism and language issues and most recently there were rape protests at Rhodes University.

LEARNING FROM 1976 & 1984

But, as shown in the 1976 revolts, where black students led a fight against racism and exclusion, and the narrow opportunities to those from black working-class homes, students have limited power, argues B. Maponyane. According to *The Worker-Tenant*, the 1976 revolt, and the big battles of the 1980s, showed the need to move from separate struggles, into involving the organised working class to fight against all forms of oppression and a radical transformation of the whole society. By ‘working class’, I mean the term as defined by anarchists: those who, not owning or controlling means of administration, coercion or production, work for those who control such means. This includes workers plus their families including the unemployed.

NEO-LIBERALISM

It also requires locating struggles against racial injustice in fights against neo-liberalism which is turning universities increasingly into another arm of capitalistic accumulation, designed to exploit – to take more than they give. Ever-rising fees make lecture theatres fortresses of privatised knowledge, entry being completely dependent on the class into which you are born, the education you can afford. Facilities are staffed by armies of precarious, contract and outsourced workers, struggling to survive and excluded from university education.

The major victim of the neo-liberal restructuring of the university is the black working class: both working-class students and campus workers. There is a direct capitalist and state attack on the working-class, not clearly captured by the ‘decolonisation’ discourse. In *Class Rule Must Fall! More Statues, More Working Class*, I point out that universities play a leading role in the continued existence of the class system, producing and reproducing privileged classes.

CLASS STRUGGLE AND CLASSROOMS

The campus space, therefore, is an arena where the class system and the class question must be confronted. The question then becomes: how?



Night vigil: Students and workers call for the release of colleagues from Brixton Police Station in Johannesburg.

First, student protests must develop a strategy linked to the working class. But this, as in 1976 and 1983, must involve a much more accurate critique of the enemy. In the 1980s, this meant locating the fight against racist education in a fight against the apartheid state and racial-capitalism, including the peripheral Fordist system. This also means understanding that problems cannot be solved by symbolic changes, or changing the composition of elite classes – it requires removing the class system, and replacing it with a new, libertarian, self-managed socialist order.

This analysis must be carried over to the black-led state of the African National Congress (ANC)'s neo-liberal policies, capitalism and elite enrichment. In *Who Rules South Africa*, Lucien van der Walt, argues that the current state is in fact 'an obstacle to the full [national and class] emancipation

of the working class.' This state is protected by a nationalist ideology, which denies the class question and which cannot – as clearly shown in 20 years – solve the social problems. This is quite evident in the way the ruling party pushed the responsibility of free education back to the universities, washing its hands clean of a problem – a problem that is structurally rooted in neo-liberal policies.

WORKING CLASS SYMBOLS

Renaming universities after nationalists is problematic, as nationalism has helped take us into the current crisis, and as nationalists have a 'pro-capitalist, pro-statist political agenda'. Rather this article argues for a left/working-class iconography: in placing the working class at the forefront to forge a new path, and moving off the nationalist dead-end, let us make working-class symbols and ideas and struggles central to transformation.

CONCLUSION

Agitate for a workers' and peoples' scientific university, not a capitalist or nationalist one. It is not enough to protest about fees and statues and curricula unless we fight the framework defended by a state that sends black working-class policemen to kill black miners. We must take from the play book of the 1980s and organise for a worker-student alliance. The universities seem to be taking their cues from old regimes relying on police and interdicts. We must then push back against all forms of oppression through a worker-student alliance against outsourcing, privatisation of education and against the bureaucratic hand that stretches all the way back to the shoulders of the state.^{LB}

Leroy Maisiri, PhD candidate in Industrial and Economic Sociology Rhodes University Rhodes University.

Working-class struggles in SA post-school education

National Student Financial Aid Scheme and Fees Must Fall campaign

In 2015 there was a new wave of campaigns at different academic institutions in a way that has not been seen in post-apartheid South Africa. The movement known as 'Fees Must Fall' had students rising up to question, not only the fees, but also make a call for inclusive public education at tertiary institutions, writes **Khomotso Ntuli**.

Patrick Bond notes that: 'For those in the society and rooting for the students, this was a critical moment, perhaps ultimately as important as the breakthrough Treatment Action Campaign's fight for free AIDS medicine 15 years ago.'

The question has to be asked about whether these protests and campaigns are actually something new and what is the common thread in these struggles?

This article looks at a study by the Centre for Education Rights and Transformation (Cert) on the experiences of young people in the Vaal. Included in the issues raised was the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) as the main route to education funding for the majority of the working-class and the poor in the country. One of the points informing our critique of NSFAS, which is also at the center of the Fees Must Fall campaign, is that the scheme virtually provides the only means to higher education

for the working-class and poor youth as stated by Zwane.

It is therefore crucial that NSFAS is properly managed to holistically support the working-class and the poor. This should be responsive to the conditions and challenges they face. We posit that it is not enough to simply allow access for the poor students without holistic support. This article focuses on the working-class and the poor people's struggle to access a commodified education system.

STRUGGLE FOR ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Students at various institutions have responded in different ways. From using dialogue with university management, to pickets, protests and disruption of the normal functioning of the universities. In an interview about a protest at Vaal University of Technology (VUT) a chemistry student from Giyani in Limpopo, explained: '... they were not

providing us with money for food you see, yes and people sometimes it's hard to get money from home, enough money in fact yes, we needed assistance from NSFAS, so we were not surviving at all'.

These difficulties are not exclusive to VUT. The national character of these experiences was brought to the fore by the Fees Must Fall movement. A section of students referred to as the 'missing middle', are students judged ineligible for the scheme, even though in reality their parents cannot afford their fees.

Another student from Limpopo, who is in this position, explains what his mother goes through:

'...I don't think she can but she's trying her hardest because she is taking loans and all that, but then I think I deserve it, because I have three other siblings, my sister who is doing Grade 11 and my other two sisters who are doing Grade 2 and Grade 3. So my mother is paying for all of us, you see so I think I deserve to get the NSFAS ...'



Distressing moments: Workers and students after release from Brixton police station.

This is a point echoed by the Minister of Higher Education and Training, Blade Nzimande, quoted by Phakathi. 'It's ... your ordinary civil servant. Your teacher, your nurse, your police (officer) who are earning significantly more than (R122,000).'

Noting the strengths of the scheme in providing education funding for the majority of the poor and working-class students, the 2010 NSFAS Ministerial Review Committee Report also pointed to various shortcomings in the scheme. Included among others is the failure to timeously channel funds from one institution to where they are needed when they have not been used. The report also pointed to the challenges in the scheme's debt recovery which was 26% at the time the total funds were loaned. This low recovery rate could either be as a result of inefficiencies in the recovery process or the lack of employment of the beneficiaries of the scheme as part of the wider youth graduate unemployment challenge. The latter is an important concern when looked at through the anxieties that some of the participants in the research related about feeling indebted during studies and without certainty of employment post-graduation.

The difficulties in accessing education with rising fees is an important concern, which when looked at through the lens of education being a right, especially in the context of post-apartheid South Africa are important elements of the post schooling sector.

H Kassa in Ikamva notes that: 'The Fees Must Fall movement was triggered by a protest at the University of the Witwatersrand over a 10.5% fee increase. Soon after other universities raised similar concerns. The movement quickly made links with broader demands for decolonisation and the call for Free Education Now. Its roots can be traced to the Rhodes Must Fall Movement and protests against the National Student Financial Aid Scheme'.

It is important to put the fee increase in the context of the challenges already faced by students. These include unsettled fees at the end of the year, difficulties with accommodation and lack of food, especially for those who do not have relatives in the area where they study.

It is in this context that we agree with Bond that the double-digit increase was the flash point that led to the nationwide protests. It is also worth appreciating that in as much as

President Zuma agreed to no fee increments for 2016, it would be a mistake to limit this to just the increase. It is in this context that we see the link that students made between the Fees Must Fall movement and the outsourcing of workers in universities as an important one, showing that this is not just about students and fees, but essentially about the experiences of the poor and working-class in South Africa.

CONCLUSION

The Fees Must Fall movement did not just start in 2015 but has risen on the tide of generalised hardships that have been experienced by a number of students and workers in South African tertiary institutions. The link between the Fees Must Fall movement and the End Out Sourcing campaign is an important one, and this comes to the fore when students view their challenges holistically. We conclude that these are struggles worth taking seriously, not only as those facing students but struggles of the poor and working-class in South Africa. ^{LB}

Khomotso Ntuli is a researcher at Cert. This article was first published in the Post-School Education Review Volume 2(1) June 2016.

Metolong Dam construction

Sinohydro exploits Lesotho communities

In a case of trampling over the rights of workers and the poor, Chinese multinational Sinohydro short changes home owners whose houses were damaged by blasting during the construction of the Metolong Dam in Lesotho, writes **Hlalele Hlalele**.

The existing political landscape of failing to honour deadlines by the Government of Lesotho (GoL) set at international fora or agreed upon with development partners such as United Nations (UN) general assembly, Southern African Development Community (SADC) summits, European Union (EU) and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is now biting. In the UN Millennium Development Goals the GoL performance was utterly abysmal: out of six goals the country showed slow progress in two while for the rest nothing was done. If the state lacks commitment to the timelines so much so that it jeopardises its political credibility and even loses the much needed funding meant to support the entire nation, then why should it bother about only 300 households affected by the construction of the Metolong Dam?

When the inauguration of the Metolong Dam in November 2015 was approaching, pressure mounted on Sinohydro, a Chinese state owned multinational company globally ranked 23rd. Responsible for building the dam, the company also had to repair damaged houses caused by its blasting operations before the ceremony. Sinohydro's failure to complete the 'restoration'

of houses to pre-construction condition could potentially draw negative publicity that would tarnish the image of the company. Unfortunately this critical period in which Sinohydro could be held to account slipped away so easily into the hands of a state agency – the Metolong Authority (MA). Sinohydro persuaded MA that there had to be new bilateral negotiations to repair houses as the number of houses damaged outside its own margin of 500 metres radius was greater than those inside the circle. Thus the repair of the houses was no longer on the priority list.

According to Motae a total of 203 houses were damaged by Sinohydro from Ha Seeiso (73), Ha Makhale (66) and Ha Makotoko (65) during the construction of the dam wall. Houses were damaged by the blasting to obtain crushed stones for the 73-metre high Metolong Dam wall which is a roller compact concrete type. Although the blasting process ended in November 2014 the contractor did not repair the houses immediately but only waited until after four months before the official launch of the Metolong Dam water supply. What does this imply about Sinohydro in relation to the welfare of house owners?

In real terms the issue of damaged houses was deeper than the face value of appearing good before Lesotho authorities. It had to do with satisfaction on the delict inflicted on the house owners and addressing the casualisation and exploitation of labour during the repairs. Sinohydro was successful in postponing the repairs with unilateral permission of the MA thus inflicting more pain on the house owners until after the launch. Unequal power relations between the MA and Sinohydro resulted in unfair labour practices during the dam construction.

PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT

The existing trends in most developing countries not unique to Lesotho are that multinational companies are glorified, honoured and praised for bringing expertise and job creation. As a result, they are not monitored for breach of legal requirements and their victims suffer irreparable harm. It is even worse for Lesotho because of its geographic position of being in the belly of South Africa as any investor is given preferential treatment to guarantee their stay. Sinohydro being a state owned multinational company came as a double-headed monster having the face of the People's



Metolong Dam: Construction in progress. Credit: Construction Review Online.

Republic of China which is a strategic donor to Lesotho in a number of developments and as a multinational company looking for profit and bringing rare skills.

It is common that labour matters in the construction sector in capital projects of this magnitude in the Mountain Kingdom will always have labour disputes which in most cases end up in violent industrial action. During the construction of Metolong Dam this was not an exception. One strike exposed the desperation of the GoL in that the then Minister of Water, Timothy Thahane, was less worried that the industrial action would delay the completion of the dam. Rather, his main concern was about explaining to the government of China the assault of her citizens that occurred during the strike as concluded by Seboping. In an unprecedented manner a trade union, the Lesotho Workers Association, was forced to make a sponsored public apology in the print media.

Comparatively, the seriousness that was demonstrated by the government and the MA about the strike and its effects was more visible than when it came to repairing the damaged houses belonging to ordinary citizens. Some residents were anxious as to when their houses would

be repaired as nothing came from either the MA or Sinohydro about compensation. At Ha Seiso, Metolong and Ha Makotoko at least two people lost monthly rental income as a result of the negligence. At this juncture a Sesotho idiom which says 'Sepa le holo ke la molata la mog'a motse ke kotokoane!' meaning rubbish done by an outsider cannot be tolerated over that of the native is now in the negative 'Sepa le holo ke la mong'a motse!' Basically it means those affected by Sinohydro are criticised for demanding too much for the repair of their houses when the company had done an excellent job of building the dam.

DAMAGED HOUSES

The deficit of seriousness by Sinohydro can be explained in two stages: the company decided to differentiate damaged houses by drawing a radius of 500 metres (m). Damaged houses inside the 500m were partly repaired. As testimony to the shoddy work done, Maletlatsa Makotoko said there were still cracks on her walls and the interior was not painted. Whereas those houses damaged beyond the 500m radius were not repaired until the end of the blasting, which speaks to the burden residents had to bear for the past three years. The rationale for this demarcation was only

known by Sinohydro. Some house owners who were desperate for a roof above their heads, repaired their own houses. One such resident is Mathato Thamae who had three houses affected especially a hut where her boys lived – which partly collapsed and twisted the roof leaving gaps for rain water to penetrate and affect the interior. To date she has not received compensation from Sinohydro.

A shocking revelation to the community and chief's ministers at Metolong Ha Makotoko was that the contractor reduced the initial radius demarcations without any explanation whatsoever. This alteration confused people who knew that their houses were reportedly inside the 500m radius. In the absence of any explanation we can only speculate why repairs were not completed in the radius of 500m. At Ha Makhale 37 houses out of 43 were repaired, in Ha Makotoko 12 houses were damaged but only seven were completed while Ha Seiso had just four damaged with only two repaired. Only 52 houses were repaired but out of that number 25 residents were dissatisfied with the repairs.

DAMAGED HOUSING BACKLOG

A company rated 23rd globally cannot claim that it is unable to repair the remaining 165 houses. Constructing the dam wall demanded more expertise and experience than repairing mud and stone houses. There was no reason to outsource such work. Sinohydro is a global award-winning company based on the construction it has done in Metolong: the foot bridge that crosses the dam at Ha Masakale and the Metolong Dam wall. As it left residents to repair their houses the company showed that the repairs were of no corporate value as there were no awards for addressing social effects!

Both MA and Sinohydro described the benefits of subcontracting as giving residents the freedom to choose the builder or to take the income opportunity for owner repairs. They proposed that the repairs be done by the locals as they had the ability. The threat that they invoked to get sympathy from the locals was that if the repair was to be done by Sinohydro it would bring strangers from elsewhere to do the job.

Working towards the dam's inauguration date was vital because the principals of the dam (His Majesty and his government mainly the prime minister and the minister of water), the representatives of the donor community and the media would be present. It was a golden opportunity missed to hold the company accountable for the damage done. Indeed Sinohydro was aware of this danger, foresaw missing the target and began talks with the MA about the 500m radius. The company also portrayed the community as uncooperative in the first phase of repairs and so opted for outsourcing the work.

SHIFTING BURDEN, REAPING BENEFITS

Both MA and Sinohydro described the benefits of subcontracting as giving residents the freedom to choose the builder or to take the income opportunity for owner repairs. They proposed that the repairs be done by the locals as they had the ability. The threat that they invoked to get sympathy from the locals was that if the repair was to be done by Sinohydro it would bring strangers from elsewhere to do the job.

The net benefit of this subcontracting pattern resulted in exorbitant proceeds earned by Sinohydro in that house owners did the unpaid job of negotiating with builders and labourers as well as supervising their work. Besides that their equipment such as spades and wheel barrows were used free of charge. The builder faced exploitation because the company dictated how much the

builders were to be paid per day. This was done irrespective of the fact that the builders brought their own tools, protective clothing and food. Sinohydro initially paid M135 (R135) but was warned that it was below the gazetted minimum wage. Deliberately, on its race to the bottom wage it took the rate equivalent to that of first entrants in the construction industry which is M150 (R150) a day.

In essence, Sinohydro shifted the burden of employing staff through labour broking: a nonstandard triangular employment relationship. The builder was not recruited by Sinohydro but by the damaged house owner yet the payment was to be done by the company. The builder was not employed in the literal sense but given instructions by the owner of the house and paid by Sinohydro at the gazetted minimum wage rate as if employed. In actual fact the builder ought to have been employed to perform this job but the company chose to shift the burden to the house owner. When the house owner was satisfied that the house was complete s/he would report to the master (Sinohydro) whose only duty at the end was to pay the builder.

Is this arrangement another form of subcontracting? This is pseudo-subcontracting which does not follow established practices of subcontracting by Sinohydro or outsourcing in the case of MA, because it is meant to exploit ordinary Basotho builders. The actual subcontracting process is achieved where the service provider gives his own cost of

labour and that can be mutually agreed through negotiations between supplier and the client and not the take-it or leave-it attitude of Sinohydro. In fact MA was just a puppet dancing to the music of the giant company.

DESPERATION, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

Sinohydro was too smart to keep its cards as close as possible to the chest and use them at the appropriate time. For instance, the timing for the repair of the houses was deliberate and strategic to put the owners of damaged houses at a desperate position since the dam was supposed to be completed in December 2015. So if their demands were too much than the contractor expected they would not be met.

Given that the National Strategic Development Plan 2012-2017, (2014) reports that the unemployment rate (conservative) in Lesotho is 29.4% and Metolong Dam Social and Environmental Impact Assessment indicates the unemployment rate at the catchment area slightly higher at 37.7%; there is absolutely no way people at such a poverty level, taking employment as a measure of daily survival income, could refuse the little they were offered. 'Half a loaf is better than no bread,' said the government.

The minimum wage had two notches, the first amount of M150 is for new entrants in the construction sector and M185 for 'employees with more than twelve (12) months of continuous service with the same employer'.

This declaratory position by Sinohydro showed no remorse on what it had done to the people but rather could even leave without repairing the houses. Thus compromising the committees in reaching a bold decision on how the issue could best be handled, lest they spoil the negotiations. Sinohydro threatened the dam committee not to make demands about the houses to the MA.

MINIMUM WAGES

The International Labour Organisation Convention 131 of 1970 states that 'the elements to be taken into consideration in determining the level of minimum wage shall, so far as possible and appropriate in relation to the national practice and conditions, include (a) the need of workers and their families, taking into account benefits and the relative living standards of other social groups ...'

Minimum wages are very important because they influence the wages in the informal economy so it is important for policy-makers, trade unions and employers to take cognisance of this relationship. Herr and Kazandziska argue that if there exist a few high wage notches and a few low wage notches on the other side the median wage is considerably higher. If there is a bulk of low wage earners and a bulk of high wage earners the median wage remains low.

A study on a basic needs basket conducted for the Lesotho textile sector in 2012 indicated basic needs at M2853, while subsistence basket costs M1880. These baskets differ because of availability of income. The former is ideal for a living wage/income earner while the latter is made up of compromises dictated by the push down syndrome by elites using the expression 'khomo ha li kae batho re bangata!'

These two cases need to be applied in Metolong for fairness.

MANIPULATING THE PROCESSES

The Metolong Dam Water Supply Project had a pseudo-public participation structure consisting of

a dam committee and a joint dam committee. The dam committee is made up of representatives from the centres, a collection of an average of three villages while joint dam committee (JDC) is made up of representatives from five community councils surrounding the dam. There is two way communication between the community and MA. Community issues are initially discussed in the centres and go through the dam committee to the JDC then to MA while MA issues start in the board rooms in Maseru and vice-versa.

Sinohydro in its strategies to go unchecked announced before both dam committee meetings that before any repair in the 500m can continue it must sit with MA and reach a settlement. This declaratory position by Sinohydro showed no remorse on what it had done to the people but rather could even leave without repairing the houses. Thus compromising the committees in reaching a bold decision on how the issue could best be handled, lest they spoil the negotiations. Sinohydro threatened the dam committee not to make demands about the houses to the MA. Meanwhile it knew quite clearly it was going to plead to extend the deadline for the house repairs, and in so doing it succeeded in manipulating the committees.

Sinohydro has stronger financial muscle than the GoL. In 2015 its revenue was US\$42.5-billion while according to the budget speech 2015/16 the GoL gross national products is M12.4-billion (US\$863.4-million). There is unequal balance of power towards Sinohydro. This inequality is made worse by the

fact that the company belongs to a hegemonic Chinese state, as such the people are trapped in a vicious cycle of exploitation. In this unequal balance of forces the nature of the state is the determining factor for benefit or loss. A weak rent seeking state and its people will always be on the periphery, while a developmental state will ensure benefit of her people at all costs.

CONCLUSION

Surely it was not the intension of the GoL to prejudice the people of Metolong for the benefit of the elites in Maseru and the other four towns: Teyateyaneng, Roma, Mazenod, and Morija, but ultimately it has been the case. In this scenario it can be said that the Kingdom government failed to put systems in place to mitigate negative effects on the people of Ha Seeiso, Ha Makotoko and Ha Makhale. The Metolong-Sinohydro saga is a typical case of it not mattering who owns the MNC (the state or individuals) as it is destined for profit at the expense of the powerless. This project exposed and characterised Lesotho as a weak state failing to protect the working class against exploitation by the employers. Simultaneously, it failed to ensure adequate compensation for pain and suffering inflicted during construction of the dam wall and proper restoration of houses, despite this being a fundamental constitutional right to compensation. ¹⁶

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Struggling to survive

Informal economy and income inequality in Zimbabwe

The post-millennium collapse of the Zimbabwean economy, characterised by de-industrialisation and job losses, has been tied to the proliferation of the informal economy. This economy is now the mainstay for many Zimbabweans, despite that it is characterised by precarious livelihoods, as less work is based on wage income, write **Crispen Chinguno, Taurai Mereki and Nunurayi Mutyanda.**

Population growth and migration has further accelerated the growth of the informal economy in Zimbabwe, as has the conspicuous growth of the poverty gap. The emergence of a new socio-economic 'class' profile has also re-engineered issues concerning broader politics and governance. However, while it is largely about survival, the informal sector is now central in framing the national and local political discourse and trajectory – a space that used to be the domain of trade unions.

Drawing on case studies from Bulawayo, Harare and Mutare this article seeks to identify the nature and drivers of income inequality in the informal economy and how the latter has changed following the demise of the formal economy. It is based on in-depth interviews, participant observations and archival research. Drawing from this evidence we argue that the Zimbabwean informal economy, which now underpins the production, distribution and consumption processes following the collapse of the

formal economy, is paradoxical. It is not just an area characterised by desperation, but it has – and is – also reconfiguring Zimbabwe's class structure, producing a new socio-economic and political economy characterised by a hierarchy with its own elite and poor.

We observed that the rise of Zimbabwe's informal economy on the one hand expresses the failure of a national structure (the economy) and the agency of ordinary citizens in response to economic challenges. Moreover, we argue that it is a form of insurgent citizenship and a way of engaging the state. Those forced into the informal sector have to fight for the right to urban space in their quest for survival and existence.

The rise of the informal economy in Zimbabwe has displaced wage labour and formal production as the core economic drivers, and likewise the role of trade unions. This does not mean they have become irrelevant. Even so, we argue that if the country's trade unions are to remain

relevant in the national socio-economic and political discourse they have to shift their focus from narrow economic struggles and adopt a social movement model of unionism that entails going beyond workplace issues and reconnecting with ordinary citizens' broader struggles for survival and existence in collaboration with other civil society groups.

The case studies revealed that collective organisations in the informal economy are quite heterogeneous and yet lethargic and fragmented: varying from ad hoc committees to highly bureaucratic institutions. Many claim to speak on behalf of the informal economy participants yet are not rooted on the shop floor and or serve their own political agenda. The motivation for many of such organisations which are often fluid is to advance political interests sometimes linked to business interests. For example, in Mutare at Sakubva Musika – vegetable market – vendors at the two markets we visited have collective structures affiliated to

the ruling party – Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) Zanu PF Youth League (Manicaland Province) whilst the traders at the flea market are affiliated to the provincial leadership of the liberation war veterans association (also affiliated to Zanu (PF)). We thus observed that political contestation and the struggles in the informal economy are often articulated to achieve different ends.

We concluded that there is need to promote effective democratic organisations in the informal economy and their engagement with the state at different levels. Collective organisations are important in articulating the interest of the participants in the informal economy.

We also concluded that the question of access to space is the central factor determining the level of income inequality in the informal economy. We further argue that access and income in the informal economy in Zimbabwe is tied to patronage politics, economies and networks tied to Zanu (PF) and in limited cases the main opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In addition, we observed that access to the informal economy is mainly through political incentives from rival political parties or contesting factions thereof. It is also tied to partisanship and linked to electoral cycles and complex patron-client politics. Important shifts as to how the informal economy is regulated and managed are likewise frequently tied to electoral cycles. Hence, the reason why politicians in Zimbabwe have turned to the informal economy for patronage allocation is not a surprise.

We also observed that the informal economy in Zimbabwe in many ways reflects the state's often predatory character. In many of the cases those who are paying levies to the local

state are not getting any direct services in return. At some sites we observed that access to space was controlled by vigilantes – commonly referred to as 'land barons' – who may or not be linked to the patronage and political networks referred to earlier.

Evidence from all three cities visited suggests that patronage-based allocation of space and resources in the informal economy has become the norm rather than an exception. Moreover, this has created a number of other problems for informal businesses and the broader democracy, i.e. politicised bureaucracies, corruption and in-cohesive political parties. This in turn has led to political inequality and consolidated the incumbent political leadership advantage and fragmented progressive civic society. Furthermore, this has also produced an attenuated citizenship and fragile political institutions.

Our field research revealed that the informal economy is largely over-subscribed. For example, all sites we visited were overwhelmed as they accommodated more than the designated number of participants. In some cases this affected the flow of street traffic. This raised questions whether the informal economy has an optimum capacity. From this, we concluded that the informal economy is not infinitely expandable, but can only absorb a certain amount of the workforce (participants) before it becomes unsustainable.

Further evidence showed that access to urban space in the informal economy is contested and that participants often work in both public and private spaces. Furthermore, the local state (urban authority) in different cities has varied tax regimes. This partly explains disparities in income even for those working in the same sectors of the informal economy.

In this regard, a major policy lesson we draw is that participants in the informal economy require protection, transparency and fairness in how public and private business space is designated and accessed.

The state needs to take full cognisance that the informal sector has filled a void following the demise of the formal economy. As a result, the government's macro-economic policy and other policy instruments must both embrace the informal economy and, more importantly where possible, work on formalisation and ensure that it does not become strangled.

It is clear from our research that some sectors and areas of the informal economy involve illegitimate activities and this also partly explains income inequality. For example, although the law in Zimbabwe restricts second-hand clothes imports, we encountered thriving informal markets for such goods in all three cities. Even though Zimbabwe has imposed a ban on unlicensed imports of fruit from South Africa, such produce likewise are usually readily available. However, any policy drawn up to combat illegal informal activities should first monitor areas of rapid growth, scrap inefficient rules and legalise certain goods and services. This will necessitate ongoing monitoring and evaluation by policy-makers in order to determine which corrective measures are necessary and when.

We observed that the Zimbabwean informal economy presents a paradox. On the one hand, it is dynamic and resilient. Yet it is also precarious. We thus concluded that our knowledge of the informal economy in Zimbabwe still needs to be improved, particularly the paucity of empirical studies to enhance evidence-based policy development and innovation.

The proliferation of the informal economy may be a characteristic of periods of low as well as high economic growth rates. Low economic growth is often tied to downsizing and retrenchment. Many of those retrenched are thus forced into the informal economy in order to eke out a living.

BACKGROUND

Zimbabwe has been in a systemic crisis since the turn of the new millennium. This has culminated in the collapse of the formal economy and the emigration of a significant proportion of the active population in response to economic and political push factors. It has also propelled the proliferation of the informal economy. In 1980, this sector accounted for less than 10% of the labour force, but it had doubled by 1986. According to Anna Tibaijuka and Zimstat by 2004 it accounted for 40% of all those in non-waged employment of one kind or another, further rising to 84% by 2012. This exponential rise has been at the backdrop of the rise of neo-liberal globalisation characterised by increasing inequality, the informal economy and precarious forms of work. One of the biggest challenges facing the world today is a growing inequality within and across nations and a decline in the quality of work. This undoubtedly has a negative impact on social cohesion, development and the quality of democracy.

The collapse of the formal economy in Zimbabwe left a void that has been slowly but steadily become occupied by a thriving and yet precarious informal economy. Highlighting an intersection of social structure and agency, it reflects the failure of structure – the formal economy – to create jobs and also reflects the positive agency of ordinary citizens and resistance. The informal economy is increasingly recognised as an alternative option to growing unemployment, particularly among the youth and the poor.

It is important from the onset to highlight that the informal economy is an important source of employment creation, economic development, income distribution and poverty alleviation in many countries. In Zimbabwe for example, 84% of the work is in the informal economy compared to 11% in the formal economy. The remaining 5% is in what are referred to as unclassified sectors. However, the fiscal contribution of the informal economy is often contested. Studies by Letlhokwa George Mpedi and many others argue that a growing informalisation of the economy reduces the state's capacity to raise revenue and provide public service and that it disturbs the national development policy and vision. Nevertheless, it remains undisputed that it is an important source of livelihood for many people in Zimbabwe and around the world in general.

The proliferation of the informal economy may be a characteristic of periods of low as well as high economic growth rates. Low economic growth is often tied to downsizing and retrenchment. Many of those retrenched are thus forced into the informal economy in order to eke out a living. Nor does high economic growth translate to automatic job creation, as it may simply reflect increased turnover. Indeed, current neo-liberal globalisation dispensation is often characterised by a jobless growth rate and high unemployment in many countries. Indeed, Zimbabwe has experienced spectacular growth in the informal economy during periods of negative and positive economic

growth, its main function being to offset work shortages in the formal economy and as a means of survival.

POLITICAL ECONOMY

Zimbabwe emerged as a nation-state following annexure by the British in 1890 after the 1884/85 Berlin conference, which presided over the partitioning of Africa.

The first phase of colonisation – 1890-1923 – saw a company-ruled economy. Zimbabwe was governed by the British South Africa Company on behalf of the British monarchy. Governance between 1923 and 1965 was under a fully colonial government. In 1965, this was replaced by white minority rule, following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. By this time, Black Nationalist politics advocating for majority rule had emerged and were no longer just an underground movement. This led to a war of liberation and independence in 1980. At this point, the new government adopted a distributive welfare economic policy as well as a land resettlement programme in order to address the land imbalances created during the colonial period. This was abandoned in 1992, following the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (Esap) as an economic blue print to rejuvenate the economy. Esap was reviewed several times but failed to improve the economic situation. This failure was followed by a fast-track land reform, which effectively destroyed commercial agriculture that, at the time, was the base of the economy. This attracted sanctions from the USA, EU and elsewhere in the West and led to a

precarious economy characterised by an unprecedented hyperinflation from 2000.

The political economy of Zimbabwe is tied to its colonial history. During the colonial era, agriculture constituted the foundation of the capitalist system of production, which was based on coercion and racial discrimination. The ensuing growth in the manufacturing economy led to change in the class structure, largely characterised by the substantial growth of the proletariat. The role of the informal economy under colonialism was peripheral. While the majority of the blacks eked a living outside the capitalist system of production, they were gradually coerced into the capitalist system of production through a process that Giovanni Arrighi termed 'stimulation and strangulation'. By 1980, peasant productivity had declined and many indigenous Africans were almost wholly dependent on wage income.

The policies adopted at independence were distributive, i.e. designed to benefit the majority. Godfrey Kanyenze and others highlight the fact that the Transitional National Development Plan saw a GDP growth of 8% per annum; an increase in investments from 19% of GDP and a 3% annual growth in wage employment. During the period 1986 to 1990, the First Five-Year National Development Plan (FFYNDP) was launched. It emphasised employment creation and poverty reduction. According to the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ), productive economies such as agriculture, mining and manufacturing grew by 3.1% while the economy registered an average annual growth rate of 3.2%. However, Zimbabwe failed to achieve the projected 4.3% economic growth rate during the FFYNDP, registering only one of 3%.

Government adopted a mass education policy that saw its expenditure on education increase from Z\$227.6-million to Z\$628.0-million between 1979 and 1990.

For the first decade primary education was free, with fees being introduced in 1991 as part of the Esap prescriptions. The introduction of free education saw school enrolments rise from 819,000 in 1979 to 2.26-million by 1985. Zimbabwe made great strides in the area of education and is ranked number two in Africa literacy levels after Tunisia. Health-care expenditure trebled from Z\$66.4-million to Z\$188.6-million during the 1980s. This increase in expenditure saw about 450 projects of rural health centres being completed out of a target of 681. This had positive implications on labour as more jobs were created and more workers and their families could access health care.

A total of 209,000 jobs were created in non-agricultural economies. Central government expenditure trebled and increased its share of GDP from 32.5% in 1979 to 44.6% in 1989, while tax revenue increased from 24.4% of GDP in 1980-83 to 28.8% in 1988-91. This squeeze on the fiscus created fertile ground for economic crises. According to Edward A. Brett despite vast achievements in improving mass - and, more importantly, free - education, health care and employment in non-agricultural economies, the 1980s were thus characterised by skyrocketing public spending particularly in the areas of civil service employment, spending on social services, drought relief, and subsidies for government owned companies which increased from 'Z\$155.9-million to Z\$205.7-million in the 1980s'. The result of this was a chronic budget deficit, a high tax regime and a rapid increase in public debt that had a negative impact on the economy.

RISE OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY

In line with the changes in the global economy, which were characterised by a rise in the hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism, Zimbabwe was covertly coerced by the Bretton Woods institutions to adopt an Esap in 1991. This was aimed at enhancing economic growth and job creation. Its adoption marked a shift from redistributive policies to neo-liberal ideology tied to stringent austerity measures. Unfortunately, it led to unprecedented and rapid de-industrialisation between the late 1980s and 1994. Losses in terms of production capacity in various sectors included: textiles -64%, metals -35%, transport equipment -31% and clothing -28%, wrote Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya. This was followed by massive retrenchments. Many of those who lost their jobs were forced into the informal economy, the de-facto employer of last resort.

An intersection of factors culminated in Zimbabwe's systemic crisis as it pertained to the processes of production, distribution and exchange. Following on from Esap and the costly intervention in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the government embarked on a controversial land reform programme in 2000 that aimed at redistributing the land to the black majority. It quickly resulted in the demise of the agriculture economy - the long-time foundation of Zimbabwe's capitalist economy. The immediate knock-on effect was the steady decline of the manufacturing sector, which was reflected in the exponential rise of the informal economy.

In many developing countries, the growth of the informal economy has been linked to the rise of neo-liberal globalisation over the last four decades. Eddie

Webster and Karl von Holdt argue in their seminal work on post-apartheid workplace regime that the erosion of the core – the formal economy – is associated with pushing many workers into the periphery (the informal economy) where work is precarious, non-decent and unorganised. Accordingly, the rise of the informal economy in Zimbabwe should be viewed as a culmination of national and supra-national factors.

At independence, the informal economy in Zimbabwe accounted for 10% of the two-million employed. By 2004, 975,000 people had formal jobs, while 4.1-million people were working in the informal economy. This meant that four out of every five workers were in the informal economy according to Malte Luebker. This increased to 94% at the peak of the economic crisis in 2009. As a result of this economic turmoil, the official inflation rate peaked at 231-million% in July 2008, stated Godfrey Kanyenze and others. Meanwhile, Steve H Hanke and Alex KF Kwok's unofficial estimate is that it had reached 79.6-billion% by mid-November of the same year.

In its policy document adopted in October 2013, named the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset), GoZ acknowledged a deep economic and social crisis that had started in 2000 and resulted in an overall cumulative decline in GDP of 50% by 2008. Financial performance during the Government of National Unity (GNU) (2009-2013) peaked, with GDP growth rates of 5.4% in 2009, rising to 11.4% in 2010 and 11.9% in 2011. The situation took a downward turn thereafter, with a rate of only 10.6% in 2012 and 3.4% in 2013.

The ZimAsset economic policy, which was adopted after the 2013 elections, promised to create at

least two million jobs to deal with the employment crisis. However, in March 2014, *Newsday* reported that 'Over 700 companies were liquidated in 2013 alone, leaving thousands out of employment, many of whom have since joined the ranks of swelling informal sector.' At a conference held in that same month, Finance Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, reported that the government had to embrace the commerce of the street as a new economic order. According to him, as quoted in *The Standard* newspaper 'this is an economic revolution, and we need to learn how to deal with the small man. The old economy is dead'. The government thus conceded that the formal economy had collapsed and been replaced by the informal sector. However, despite its contribution to employment, this sector remains marginalised. Most government policies continue to view the informal economy as peripheral to formal sector activities.

Drawing from the African experience, Guy CZ Mhone explained the significance of the informal economy and the reasons why it should not be viewed as a transient phenomenon. He states that formal economies in African countries are based on exogenous growth. As a result, the capacity to absorb new workers is limited. The remainder is thus forced to be creative and fight exclusion by entering the informal economy. Mhone views the emergence of the informal economy a result of a creative response to ongoing vulnerability and exclusion.

Therefore, there is little consensus on the informal economy. This makes it complex to compare its respective socio-economic contributions in different countries. However, the discussion has identified some of its common characteristics. The working definition of the informal economy adopted in this

article is of all economic activities characterised by precariousness, unfavourable conditions, lack of or ignorance about social security and health care and the absence or weak collective voice. This definition extends to include own-account workers, or in the formal or informal enterprises.

Interest in the informal economy has increased over recent decades. Focusing on the geographical locations of such markets helps to illustrate some of the problems involved in regulating the macro- and micro-aspects of informal trading areas. Locations are customer-dependent and while a critical mass of stalls can draw customers, the flow of people as a result of transport modes, large institutions, access to services and the presence of other retail activity are of great importance in providing a sufficient customer base to support large-scale agglomerations of informal trading. Many of these factors may provide synergies, although there clearly are potential tensions between formal and informal retailing.

We postulate that the rise in the informal economy in Zimbabwe is tied to the emergence of a new class process and transformation that is characterised by a crisis in production, distribution and exchange processes. It is anchored in the informal economy and typified by inequalities within and between classes. Hence, a new class structure is in the process of being reconfigured as the 'formal economy' takes a back step. ^{LB}

Crispen Chinguno, Taurai Mereki and Nunurayi Mutyanda are Global Labour University Alumni from Zimbabwe. Other members of the research team were Janet Munakamwe and Rwatirinda Mabembe. The research was funded by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Zimbabwe.

Britain's exit from the European Union

What it means for the SA working-class

Of what significance is Britain's exit from the European Union (EU) to the South African working class? **John Manana** explains the tension between trade liberalisation and working-class politics.

Britain's exit from the EU or Brexit as it has become known sparked a series of debates from different walks of life including media houses and economists. Accordingly, Brexit poses different questions to international relations circles who give credence to the notion of statehood including sovereignty and the impact of intergovernmental organisations at a global level. Similarly, political commentators from different schools of thought interpret Brexit differently because of contending class interests and ideological orientation. Nonetheless, the main thrust of this article attempts to pay attention to the meaning of Brexit and its relative impact to left politics or the working-class political project.

The referendum vote and its outcomes in Britain, took the world by surprise for a variety of reasons; 52% voted to leave against 48% to remain and this triggered mixed feelings for British citizens in particular and to the world in general. The questions that arise are

why we should bother ourselves about the referendum outcomes of faraway places like Britain and the EU. The critical question we should ask is: What are the benefits associated with being a member of the EU? What are the forces driving Brexit and their class orientation?

These questions are more critical in terms of locating and understanding the main motives that pushed Brexit. Furthermore, they capture the underlying interests and the class content of the leave and remain campaigns, including the possible beneficiaries of such moves.

In a nutshell, the referendum outcomes pose serious economic effects and challenges to South Africa and the world at large given the extent to which the global economy fosters economic integration. Thus, it follows that when the British economy sneezes the global economy catches the flu thus creating multiplier effects, especially to the Global South. These include national economic meltdown coupled with job losses, food and oil price hikes.

Indeed, Brexit is bound to create economic turmoil in light of the slow global economic growth which was spawned by the 2008 global financial crisis. For instance, it was reported by different media houses that the global economic crisis eroded millions of jobs, and in turn created layoffs, workplace restructuring, short-time work, corroded workers' social benefits (provident funds, medical benefits and housing allowances) and compelled countries to cut their budgets on social spending such as education, health-care provisions and social grants. In the case of South Africa the economy stands to suffer the most because of trade relations with Britain and the EU. According to *The Star*: 'South Africa's exports to the United Kingdom totalled R42-billion in 2014 and R35-billion in 2015.'

Minister of Finance Pravin Gordon added: 'Trade links between South Africa and Britain are fairly strong based on solid agreements that we have with them. We have a two year period during which to factor in changes.



United Front marches: Against globalisation and neo-liberal policies.

The Treasury and the Reserve Bank will be meeting in the coming days but South African financial institutions are strong enough to withstand shocks.'

National Treasury also hastened to allay possible economic ramifications and fears that could be spawned by Brexit: 'Those relations and the country's resilient financial sector will cushion against any harsh impact on the local economy. There are concerns over a global economic slump.'

On the contrary, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) asserts: 'Brexit could seriously damage the EU economy and even the global economy. In the current weak economic climate, the impact could be very severe. The notion that a united Europe is absolutely necessary for global prosperity is often seen among certain circles in the mainstream who believe that the supporters of a UK exit from the EU represents an existential threat to a wonderful, almost "utopian", European unity.'

IMF, further asserts: 'It's most adverse Brexit scenario predicts

2019 growth', 5.6% below what it would otherwise have been, and also a drop in GDP in 2017 of 0.8%, which an IMF official described as a 'recession'.

Under this scenario the UK would return to GDP growth of 2.9% in 2021. But the UK would have missed out on 4.5% of growth by then, it said.

Following Brexit, the IMF said the UK would have to negotiate new trade terms with the EU if it wanted to stay in the single market.

On the other hand the leave campaign emancipated Britain from EU regulations to negotiate new trade deals with other countries and to regain sovereignty.

The assertion that South African economic policies could circumvent possible global economic ramifications is misleading given the fact that the SA economy is tied to the global economy and it's more vulnerable just like other developing national economies in the world. The recent steel price crisis including product dumping that crippled many jobs

and affected local industries attest to the latter fact. It follows that the steel industry crisis which was triggered by cheap steel from China, proved that the South African steel industry was not even protected through measures such as tariffs. As a consequence, the South African working class suffered severely. This was also the case with other steel related industries.

In response to the effects of the steel crisis in 2015 Kobus de Beer from the South Africa Institute of Steel Construction (SAISC) industrial development director argues: 'It is time for us to appreciate that we cannot afford to lose our industries, especially those that are not high tech but provide typical employment for South Africans.'

Continues de Beer: 'It is time that the world is moving in the direction of protectionism, as free trade and globalism have not proved to be all they were cracked up to be, especially from the vantage point of majority of population.'



At the centre of leave campaign was the traditional Conservative Party's Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn from the Labour party. The role of the two dominant parties in the leave and remain campaigns respectively, reflects class struggle and interests to a certain degree. In brief, Johnson, now UK foreign secretary in new Prime Minister Theresa May's cabinet, argued for 'a new relationship based more on trade, on cooperation, with much less of this supranational element'.

He added: 'I don't see how, having worried about this issue for quite so long and having fulminated for quite so long about the lack of democracy in the EU, I can pass up the only chance any of us have in our lifetimes to put an alternative point of view.' Basically, Johnson's concerns stem from the fact that the EU seems to impose stringent regulations to the market forces and reduce state sovereignty. Most importantly, the Conservative Party is often considered as the key architect of neo-liberal policies, which could be traced to the Margaret Thatcher era when trade unions' power was reduced through privatisation programmes. These programmes resulted in rapid workplace restructuring, introduced austerity measures

and gave market forces leverage to the national economy. Thus, Johnson raises serious concerns about supranational element which curtails the dominance of market forces. In this regard one can argue that right (Conservative Party) wing politics advocates for market liberty and trade liberalisation at all cost.

In contrast, Corbyn echoed left inclined political lines which seek to fight for certain reforms: 'We want UK to remain part of a member but will try to remain to reserve any 'damaging changes' negotiated by former Prime Minister David Cameron.

'We, the Labour Party are, overwhelmingly for staying in, because we believe the European Union has brought investment, jobs and protection for workers, consumers and the environment. But we also recognise that our membership offers a crucial route to meeting the challenges we face in the 21st century, on climate change, on restraining the power of global corporations and ensuring they pay fair taxes, on tackling cyber-crime and terrorism, on ensuring trade is fair with protections for workers and consumers and in addressing refugee movements.'

Certainly, the EU presents positive possibilities for the working-class formations to gain respectively, compared to Britain's exit which was driven by right wing politicians who present the issue of possible free trade agreements without paying attention to the state of the working class, workers' rights and environment laws. More critically, the EU class content revolves around mutual benefits logic which embraces 'market fundamentalism' (trade liberalisation and open markets) to a certain degree, but provides the basis to advocate for working-class politics. Thus, Corbyn rightly highlights critical socialist project aspects such as protecting workers' rights, restraining global corporation's power, fair trade, environment laws and striving for reforming the EU in order to achieve social justice.

These socialist aspects require all workers of the countries to unite as Marx and Engels put it in the Communist Manifesto: 'throughout history we see the oppressor and oppressed in constant opposition to each other. This fight sometime is hidden and sometimes open. However, each time the fights end in either a revolutionary reconstitution of society or in the classes' common ruin'. Nonetheless, the political and financial crisis in Greece and the British political crisis illustrate nothing else but the challenges and limitations of capitalist governments and the weaknesses of working-class formations and their failure to seize the moment to strive for social justice.

Nevertheless, the EU as the single market creates a formidable social force (working class) that will in turn fight for the revolutionary reconstitution of the society at large as Marx and Engels asserted! ¹⁸

John Manana is a United Front and National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) activist.

A question of leadership

Following the vote by Britain to leave the European Union (EU) there has been much interest in British politics and on what this means for South Africa. Some of the questions have included what role the Labour Party will play in the future. **Hilary Wainwright** analyses the leadership question with regard to Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party.

‘**H**e’s a decent man, with great integrity – but he’s not a real leader’, is the constant refrain from Jeremy Corbyn’s critics, questioning his electability. At the same time, half of the voting population has railed – in the Brexit vote – against the establishment, jam packed with would-be and retired leaders of the kind that critics want to put in Corbyn’s place. Isn’t it time we put the idea of leadership as we know it under scrutiny?

Let’s start by distinguishing Jeremy Corbyn’s electability from his credibility as prime minister on the model required by our present unwritten constitution, under which immense and mostly invisible powers are concentrated on Her Majesty’s First Minister.

ELECTABILITY AND ORGANISATION

First, the conditions for his electability ... a starting point must be that the general election he will face, whenever it comes, will not be taking place in a functioning political system with a high turnout and strong levels of trust in the main political parties. Rather, it will come after more than a decade of growing disengagement from mainstream politics, especially by the young and

the poor and insecure, to a point where the present government was voted for by only 24% of the eligible electorate and many constituency Labour parties have been struggling even to ensure a quorum at their meetings.

To be electable in today’s mood of anti-establishment politics, any leader and party has to be able to reach out beyond the political system and give a voice to those who have no vested interest in that system. Neither left nor right in the Labour Party has been good at this, preferring to presume that the party’s union links provide them with an in-built communication with the wider public. Corbyn, aided by the one-person, one-vote system for electing the leader has not taken union support for granted, and has shown himself able to reach out and demonstrate that he would open up spaces in politics for the disenfranchised and ensure they had a voice. He has re-engaged hundreds of thousands of young people, whether or not they are union members.

The explanation emerges in conversation with anyone under 30 who has an ounce of idealism. Gemma Jamieson Malik, for example, a London PhD student

driven by housing costs to live out of London, explains: ‘It’s not that I’m a Jeremy Corby fan. It’s that he’s opened a space for a new politics I and my friends can feel part of. He’s generated a new energy around Labour.’

Or young artist Mel Evans speaking at a local Momentum meeting: ‘I haven’t been to a party-related political meeting like this for ten years; they had become so boring and so pointless. Now with Jeremy I feel I have a voice and it’s worth being involved.’

Typically, the young don’t just engage with institutions as they are; they bring new ideas and they shake things up, producing new political configurations with the potential of attracting more of their generation. Hence Momentum, the organisation created largely by these young Corbynista is not an organisation that fits with the stereotypes of the traditional left. It sees the provision of political education through football sessions with alienated youth as important as left caucuses in the party, if not more so; it chooses initiatives like the People’s PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics) over the stale, pale, male political rallies of the past.

This is the generation whose culture, including political culture, has been shaped by using the tools of the new information and communication technology to share, collaborate and network, emancipating themselves daily from overbearing authority, hierarchy and other forms of centralised, commanding domination. A collaborative, facilitating kind of leadership and political organisation is the only one with which they can engage.

In this way they are building on the innovations of the class of '68 - Jeremy Corbyn's generation. For this reason, the gap between generations and classes shouldn't be exaggerated. Older working-class people of Corbyn's generation listened to Bob Dylan, and the women in their communities were influenced by and contributed to feminism.

MONEY WHERE HIS MOUTH IS

On the other hand, as the Brexit result demonstrates, there are distinct problems to be addressed among the white working class, where strong feelings of abandonment and powerlessness have led, with the aid of right-wing media and politicians, to a scapegoating of immigrants and of the EU. Again, the current Labour leadership, with its commitment to fight austerity, is well placed to reach out to those whose lives and communities have been all but destroyed by cuts, low pay (and no pay), privatisation and casualisation. Jeremy Corbyn can commit himself to putting money where his mouth is when he says that immigration is not the cause of people's social and economic desperation.

But the Brexit vote indicates that the problems are not simply economic. What also surfaced was the problem of power and powerlessness. Here there is a confluence with the aspirations of the young to achieve some control over their future. But

while the urban young use new technologies to create forms of daily collaborative control over their lives, people without easy resources of mobility and communication need other sources of control that they too can feel, in their daily lives.

Here the role of the unions is vital - but not so much in their conventional role as funders and foot soldiers for the party's election campaigns. Nor is it only about their ability to defend jobs or bargain for better wages. It is also about enabling their members and the wider workforce to obtain greater control over the organisation and purpose of their work, especially in the public sector; an increasing emphasis on the organisation of part-time and casual workers; and support for co-operatives and similar structures as a means by which precarious workers can develop collective strength.

Greater control of our working lives is limited, however, if our wider political environment is controlled by a remote, over-centralised political system through which there is little or no chance of a voice in decisions about housing, the environment or the national and international decisions of war and peace, trade and investment that shape our lives.

BEYOND THE 'STRONG MAN'

This brings me to the second understanding of leadership: that judged according to the criteria drawn from the nature of prime ministerial power in the British state, a position shaped by decades of adaptation - but not transformation - of the job description of the chief executive at the headquarters of a global empire.

The figure of Winston Churchill continues to haunt. The 'strong man' notion of leadership by which Jeremy Corbyn appears all too often to be judged is not just a matter of a 'macho' style (though a strong feminist influence would help in any radical rethinking of

leadership). It is embedded in the nature of the UK's unwritten constitution and the immense but opaque power that it gives to the executive: extensive powers of patronage, powers to go to war, be ready to press the nuclear button, to be at the table of the UN Security Council and NATO, and in many ways preserve the continuity of the British state.

So my argument is that though the conditions for Corbyn's electability are entirely within our grasp - especially if his critics in the Parliamentary Labour Party showed some of the respect for party unity that the left has shown throughout the party's history - his credibility as prime minister would require an effective challenge to the centralised nature of power in our political system, including the anti-democratic 'winner-takes-all' electoral system. This challenge would need to be made now, while in opposition, with extensive popular participation. This has been his declared goal but he and the shadow minister responsible, Jon Trickett, have been demoralisingly slow in progressing it. The 'new politics' that Corbyn proclaims surely needs to be an explicit agenda of institutional change, not simply a change of style at the front bench dispatch box.

Questions of institution and of policy are closely allied. Jeremy Corbyn's critics are rarely explicit about how far their criticisms of Corbyn are of his capacities to match up to the responsibilities of highly concentrated power. Or whether, in fact, the implicit issue at the heart of the rebellion, maybe not shared or recognised by all the resignees, is a disagreement on policy: on nuclear power, war, security, respect for the continuity of executive power - a disagreement that will surface and become explicit as the repercussions of Chilcot for our political system and established forms of political leadership,

become clear. And finally a belief, reflecting the influence of shadowy pressures coming from 'the permanent state' who quite simply will not allow a socialist who means what he says, to be prime minister.

Either way, it would be perverse, in the face of the strength of anti-establishment feeling from young and old, to replace a leader committed to breaking establishment power with one who is committed and ready to preserve it.

The results of Spain's recent election point in a similar direction. There, the voice of a new politics, Unidos Podemos, failed to continue its stunning electoral rise, partly because its leader Pablo Iglesias started to act like a conventional politician and the party leadership closed down its local activist circles. In other words, electability in the context of today's anti-establishment consciousness requires radical political reform and the alliances to achieve it, not an obsession with being an establishment in waiting.

BEYOND PARLIAMENT

A further challenge from Spain and from the experiences of the Latin American left which influenced the leadership of Podemos, is this: a distinctive feature of the radical left worldwide is the emphasis that it places on action and organisation beyond parliament. The importance of this is not in counter position to action in and through parliament but rather as a necessary source of counter power to the powerful vested interests that have blocked or undermined radical policies for which elected governments in the past have had a popular mandate.

In the aftermath of the problematic experiences of left governments in Latin America, however, it is necessary to go further and distinguish between different forms of extra-parliamentary popular organisation from the point of view of the kind of counter power they create. Left leaders in Latin

America, whether Nestor Kirchner, Hugo Chavez, Eva Morales or Lula Da Silva have tended to act when in government as if left populist street mobilisations were sufficient as a source of counter power. This approach has proved difficult to sustain and inadequate as a means of broadening popular support. It rallies supporters but it does not provide a sustainable way of creating alliances and reaching out to the disaffected.

The deeper, more power-sharing kinds of popular participation, other, usually more local, experiences from Latin America are more promising. For example, participatory budgeting in the Workers' Party's early days when significant sums of money were allocated through municipalities sharing decision-making power (not simply consulting) with citizens who organised themselves through autonomous institutions of mass participation or again in the Workers' Party early support for the land occupations and cultivation by the MST (Landless Workers' Movement). The point about these two examples is that they involve political support for and collaboration with, autonomous citizens' organisations asserting their transformative capacity through material, productive initiatives of a sustained kind, and in a way which illustrates the kind of society that would be possible if they could be spread more widely. In fact, in the case of the Workers' Party in Brazil, its leadership not only failed to generalise such participatory initiatives but made alliances within the corrosive political system, in order to gain and remain in office but at the cost of abandoning wider sources of power to change society.

In Corbyn's case, such opportunities to support and help build transformative power through genuinely participatory methods – beyond simply mobilising support – are provided by radical trade union struggles over the purpose and content of their members' work (for example recent positive campaigns of the NUT reaching out to parents

and the wider community); they are evident in the environment movement around experiments in democratically organised renewable energy sources; they are illustrated historically in the radical economic policy of the GLC, in workers' initiatives toward diversification of the defence industry away from weapons of mass destruction (like Trident) and in the many feminist initiatives to bring about changes that liberate women here and now through expanded and democratised public services.

Corbyn has talked about following through his belief in the wisdom of ordinary people by drawing up the Labour Party's manifesto in a participatory manner, rather than going off to write it with his advisers. This could provide an opportunity once his mandate has been renewed in the forthcoming elections, to move beyond the defensive stance of many of his first nine months, and build a genuinely power sharing form of participation.

Our best chance of ensuring that the widespread anti-establishment sentiment becomes a force for democracy and not for reaction, is to support Jeremy Corbyn in building such a creative, participatory process as part of contributing to a collaborative, networked movement for political change. Times are so interesting and moving so fast that it is easy to become part of a Corbyn focused spectator support. What is needed however is practical support, especially initiatives through Constituency Labour Parties and also Momentum which in many areas and nationally is open to being a platform for a wide range of creative actions. ¹⁸

Hilary Wainwright is a fellow of the Transnational Institute and a member of Red Pepper's (www.redpepper.org.uk) editorial collective, where this article first appeared. This article was also published in A Socialist Project e-bulletin 10, 1282, July 2016.

Banyana's road to Rio Olympics



Posing for team photo: Banyana before a match at Peter Mokaba Stadium, Polokwane.

The journey to the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games in Brazil has not been an easy one for the South African Senior Women's National Football Team, Banyana Banyana, but is a result of hard work and thorough preparations, writes **Nhlanhla Sechele**.

Banyana qualified for the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games in Brazil after defeating Equatorial Guinea 1-0 in a tough second leg battle last year at the Estadio de Bata in Bata, Equatorial Guinea.

Banyana's journey has been long coming, after they failed to pass through the group stages for the 2012 Olympics. Since then they have been determined to go to Brazil. Netherlands-born coach Vera Pauw, who took over this team in 2014, prepared and kept the team motivated. After reaching the semi-final of the African Women's Championship and failing to qualify for the World Cup Banyana kept their focus on the Olympics.

- In September 2011, Banyana, who are sponsored by Sasol, qualified for the 2012 London Olympic

Games after a 1-1 draw, defeating Ethiopia 4-1 on aggregate.

- In doing so, they became the first Banyana team to qualify for a major international tournament.
- On 25 July 2012 Banyana made their debut at the Olympic Games. However, they lost two matches against Sweden 4-1 and Canada 3-0 and drew against Japan 0-0.

CURRENT FORM

Based on their current performance, the much improved side has a better chance of realising their dream. Recently, they narrowly lost 1-0 in an international friendly against reigning Olympic and World Champions USA and also did well in two matches against the highly-rated Dutch team in June. Banyana are ranked 52nd in the world and have been drawn

against sides that are ranked 1st and 12th and this will be a tough group but with the experience in the team they are likely to make it into the group stages.

Amanda Dlamini has made 100 appearances for this senior national team and joins Janine van Vyck the team's captain who has 130 caps in the century mark and Nompumelelo Nyandeni who has 124. Unfortunately the Banyana road to Olympics glory came to an abrupt end when they failed to go beyond the group stage. The team lost 1-0 to Sweden, 2-0 to China and had a goalless draw with host nation Brazil. ^{LB}

Nhlanhla Sechele is a Media & Special Projects officer with the South African Schools Football Association.

On things falling



On all things falling prefixed by hashtags ...
Rhodes, Fees, Outsourcing
And anything in between that can't be boxed in ... to slogans
When we protest
Let's remember also the things that make homes
That hone and fuel the potent pen - the poets spear
And the bricks that follow
As reminders of the hollow promises of the Freedom Charter
That easily pass for wall paper, four-walled, to decorate our tug of war
It papercuts
If walls could talk what would they say to us?

Hee!
HE ... Higher Education
HE ... Patriarchy
HE ... HE ... HE, it's not funny Mr. President
Come to my residence
And you'll understand the violence of inequality
And the gentrification of education
That makes us the lovechild of the sordid affair of corporate governance
This oxymoron of development
Leaves us smudged in the middle
Of juxtapositions, contradictions
Of a common interest conflict-bridled
By profit-driven corporate interests
Economic hitman - speak on it!

Invisible hands clearly seen orchestrating forces of supply and demand
But yet deny their hand in drowning us in debt
If walls could talk

On all things falling, prefixed by hashtags ...
Rhodes, Fees, Outsourcing
And anything in between that can't be boxed in ... to slogans
When we protest,
Let's remember also the things that make homes
The four-walled struggles that are not seen
That are wanting
Not sexy,
Not catchy
That are uncomfortable and messy
Tedious, less dramatic
Like writing the curriculae that paint,
Through our four-walled struggles
Horizons of the world our protests beckon.

Kbanyisile Ngalo, Nelson Mandela Institute for Education and Rural Development

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