# What is Iraeli/Palestine clash about?

## Part 3: Arab states betray Palestine

The previous two *Labour Bulletins* charted the early history of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In this part **Chandra Kumar** tells of how the Arab states progressively abandoned Palestinian struggles in favour of a more profitable alliance with the US and Israel.

he previous article ended with I srael and the U nited States drawing closer as the U S sought to become the dominant power in the Middle E ast 0 n 5 June 1967 I srael attacked E gypt T his was a turning point in cementing its relationship with the U S. A fter the 1967 war, I srael became the main enforcer of regional stability for the U S. In the C old War period this meant keeping the Soviet U nion from becoming too influential in the region.

In 1967 Egypt began to build up troops in the Sinai close to I srael's border, but it was not clear what prime minister N asser was planning. The I sraelis claimed that Egypt, Syria and Jordan wanted to attack it, and that it was defending itself by striking first I srael's aggression was illegal under Article 51 of the UN C harter, which says that a country can only defend itself when there is a clear threat of an attack.

With its strong air force, I srael easily defeated its A rab foes and occupied the E gyptian Sinai, the G olan H eights (Syria), G aza (then under E gyptian control) and the West B ank including E ast Jerusalem (then under Jordanian rule). E ven if I srael was defending itself, its occupation of these territories was illegal.

I srael has never agreed to

withdraw from these occupied Palestinian territories

Instead, there are now more than 285 000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank, with another 193 000 in East Jerusalem. The current right-wing government in I srael has plans to expand its settlements.

Since the 1970s, I srael and the US have rejected annual UN G eneral A ssembly resolutions in favour of a two-state settlement where each country is recognised as a separate state (see *SALB 34.3*). This again shows how much responsibility the US bears for I srael's colonial policies in Palestine.

### **BLACK SEPTEMBER**

The Palestinian Liberation 0 rganisation (PL0) had been founded in 1964 under the Arab League. It called for the liberation of all Palestine through armed struggle, the defeat of Zionist colonialism and Western imperialism in the Middle East, as well as the right of Palestinian refugees to return (see *SALB 34.1*). A fter I srael had seriously weakened N asser and the Arab movement in the 1967 war, Palestinian nationalism and the PLO began to grow.

In 1968, the PLO became a mass organisation after Palestinian and Jordanian troops engaged I srael in the 'B attle of al K aramah'. I srael

raided two Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, one in K aramah, believing that the Jordanian authorities would turn a blind eye. But it turned into a full-scale battle and the Jordanian army inflicted heavy losses on I sraeli forces.

A fter the battle of al K aramah, the Palestinians spoke of incorporating Jordan into Palestine. This alarmed conservative Jordanian leaders who were faced by Palestinian socialist revolutionaries who wanted the Palestinian struggle to become a broader social revolution in all A rab countries The US and I srael turned to crushing the PLO and sided with the Jordanian monarchy in its civil war against Palestinian guerrillas

The crushing of the Palestinians in Jordan is known as 'Black September'. This showed how I srael and most conservative A rab monarchies had become closer than they ever publicly admitted. If the threat of democratic, progressive change emerges in these countries, they tend to work together to keep the structures of class domination, as well as US imperialism in place.

N either the I raqis in eastern Jordan, nor the Egyptians, nor the Saudis under K ing H ussein helped the Palestinians T he Palestinians were defeated by their A rab enemies as well as by I srael and the U.S.



Black September showed that many of the Arab elites were more worried by democratic social movements than they were by the existence of I srael. Class divisions proved more important than divisions along national, ethnic or religious lines.

## US CLIENT REGIMES IN MIDDLE FAST

Some critics of I srael argue that the powerful I sraeli lobby controls the U S government T hey say that I srael often pursues policies that upset A rabs in the Middle E ast T his is taken as meaning that even U S oil companies play second fiddle to the powerful I sraeli lobby.

But given the relative economic and military power of the US and Israel, this claim is extreme. It is the US, not Israel that has military bases in over 150 countries, and it is the US, not Israel, that dominates global economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade 0 rganisation. It is Israel that depends on a constant supply of weapons and money from the US.

The US is able to maintain its dominance in the Middle East because it has formed strong alliances with right-wing regimes

The US client regimes of Egypt

- and Jordan are ruled by corrupt, repressive governments T hey cooperate with the US on regional security and in the war on terror'.
- The Arab Gulf states (six monarchies on the Persian Gulf) of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) established in 1981 comprised of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates The US has over 100 000 military personnel in these countries. Q atar was home to the US Central Command headquarters for the 2003 GulfWar.The oil revenues of Saudi Arabia allow it to buy US weapons and equipment and also to invest heavily in the U.S.
- Israel, which has been the most important pillar of US power in the region since 1967. A side from rolling back popular movements in the Middle East, Israel cooperates closely with the US in military and intelligence matters.

So far, the A rab monarchies in the region have kept their power, but this may not continue. If popular movements in these countries rise up again and stand in solidarity with the Palestinian struggle against I srael, then the US may loosen its ties with I srael.

#### **EGYPT BETRAYS PALESTINE**

A fter a further war with I srael, the 1973 Yom K ippur War, Egypt moved closer to the West Egypt was stronger militarily in this war than in the 1967 war so in peace talks the Sinai was returned to Egypt in 1979. Egypt and I srael now became allies.

Egypt opened its economy to Western investment and became a close ally of the U.S.The Egyptian military gets massive aid from the U.S.

Before the 2008 I sraeli assault on G aza, I sraeli foreign minister T zipi Livni told Egyptian officials of I srael's plan to attack G aza Egypt assured H amas that an I sraeli attack was *not* going to happen. For the two years prior to this attack, Egypt had helped I srael to implement a blockade of goods into Palestine which caused untold suffering

## PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND HAMAS

In 1994 the Palestinian Authority was formed following an agreement between the PLO and I srael. It was an interim body during which time final negotiations between the two parties were to take place but never did

The administration of the Palestinian Authority governs parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It also controls security and civilian issues in Palestinian urban areas The remainder of Palestinian territories, including I sraeli settlements, the Jordan Valley, and bypass roads between Palestinian communities, remained under I sraeli control.

The Palestinian Authority has become yet another Arab elite that tries to win the favour of the US and Israel. In Palestine the Authority falls under Fatah which is a major Palestinian political party and the largest faction of the PLO which is a multi-party confederation. Fatah is a far cry from what the PLO once was Although it had strong involvement in revolutionary struggles in the past, unlike its rival H amas, it is no longer regarded as a terrorist organisation by any government.





A Jordanian military unit returns after the Battle of al-Karamah in 1968.

In the 2006 elections, Fatah lost its majority in the Palestinian parliament to H amas and became the main opposition party.

The PLO Teadership, for many years under Yasser Arafat, tried to imitate Anwar Sadat who succeeded Nasser as Egyptian president until his assassination in 1981.

Sadat followed a strategy of gaining American acceptance in defending Palestinian rights The problem however is that unlike Egypt the Palestinians are weak and poor and have little to offer the U.S. By pursuing this strategy Arafat, posed no threat to U.S.I sraeli domination. While the Palestinian leadership in the Palestinian Authority has gained privileges from collaborating with I srael, most Palestinians continue to suffer terribly

Like Fatah, Hamas is also not a revolutionary force as it upholds conservative and especially gendered rules of I slam. But Hamas is more representative in than the Palestinian Authority. Unlike the Authority. Hamas has not been willing to

accept I sraeli 'peace' accords and 'roadmaps' that fly in the face of international consensus I hough H amas has used terrorist methods, it has been willing to stop this during periods of ceasefire with I srael.

#### **SAUDI PEACE PLAN**

D espite working with the US, in the past the Arab states have sometimes promoted the Palestinian cause.

In 2002, Saudi Arabia came up with a two-state peace plan that included 'normalising' relations with I srael if it withdrew from 0 ccupied Palestinian Territories. The 22 members of the Arab League approved this peace offer.

Sadly I srael and the US did not take the Saudi plan seriously, although recently the 0 bama administration has agreed with aspects of it excluding the A rab L eague calling for a two-state settlement, with I srael withdrawing to pre-1967 borders

The leadership of the Arab states have already 'normalised' relations with I srael (apart from Jordan). They aim to cooperate with I srael to help

develop the Middle East as a neoliberal 'free trade zone'.

Since the early 1990s, the US has attempted to change the Middle East into a neo-liberal 'free trade' zone. It wants to integrate I srael's economy with the economies of the Arab countries T his is what normalising relations with I srael means In 2006, the US Secretary of State, C ondoleeza Rice, called this emerging neo-liberal arrangement, the 'N ew Middle East'.

The 'N ew Middle E ast' government policies included privatisation, cutting public spending, opening countries to foreign investment, reducing state subsidies, retrenchment and harsher conditions for workers and trade unions, and free trade agreements. The IMF and World Bank as well as regional organisations such as the Arab Monetary Fund and the Arab Business Council encourage these policies.

Factories, hospitals, electricity and water plants, postal services, banks, airlines and other businesses have been privatised in countries throughout the A rab region and they have opened up oil and gas fields to foreign capital. I raq's 37-year policy of nationalisation has been reversed. I his is also happening in the G ulf States where state subsidies for food, electricity, fuel and rent have been withdrawn because the W orld B ank and IMF demand this in exchange for loans and aid.

Chandra K umar was a volunteer researcher at Workers World Media Production in 2008. This series is a shortened version of a booklet 'I srael and the Palestinian Struggle for National SelfRule' published by WWMP in 2009.

In the next and final episode SALB continues discussion of neoliberalism in the Middle East and how this has affected Palestinian workers We also look at solutions and solidarity with the people of Palestine